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Chapter  1 
 
Introduction 
 
Most discussions and analyses of federalism focus upon the relationship between 
different levels of government (Bowman, 2004).  This may refer to the relationship between the 
national and state or state and local governments (Bowman, 2004).  This is also known as 
vertical federalism (Bowman, 2004).  The distinguishing feature is that one level of government 
has authority over another.   
 Horizontal federalism differs in that it refers to the relationship between governmental 
units that have no authority over the other or are on a par.   Most relevant for the purposes of this 
thesis, it invariably pertains to the relationship between the various state governmental entities 
that have the same relationship with the national government (Bowman, 2004).   This generally 
refers to interstate cooperation through such mechanisms as interstate compacts, multi-state legal 
actions, and uniform state laws (Bowman, 2004).  This generally means binding agreements 
between states via legislatures or other governmental bodies.   
By contrast, horizontal federalism in the judicial context refers to the non-binding 
influence of one state over another.  A state court may choose to cite or follow the decisions of a 
sister state court or decline to do so.   This thesis studies horizontal federalism through a citation 
analysis of the dissemination of decisions from the California, Michigan, and New Jersey 
supreme courts in regard to the narrow area of New Judicial Federalism (use of state 
constitutions to provide greater rights for the accused than those afforded under the United States 
Constitution in the area of defendant's criminal procedural rights) among the other state supreme 
courts.  
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Those courts were chosen for two reasons. First, they have been deemed prestigious 
(and/or influential – since some scholars equate the two terms) in empirical studies of policy 
diffusion via the courts. Second,   they have been deemed prestigious or to have lost prestige by 
non-quantitative legal research or by scholars who pass judgment on the courts based on the 
scholar’s values. 
This area of law was chosen for two reasons. First, every state court of last resort has a 
record of these decisions. Second, every state Bill of Rights has provisions governing the rights 
of criminal defendants.  For example, every state constitution has a fourth Amendment 
equivalent. Moreover, many of these state constitutional provisions are substantially similar to 
the federal Bill of Rights.  This facilitates the comparison between state courts and constitutions 
and with the federal courts and Constitution.   
The data comes from two different forms of citation analysis. The first analysis is 
predicated on an analysis of case citations in state courts of last resort.  As will be explained in 
detail later, high citation rates are empirically a proxy for prestige and influence.   That is, the 
more frequently a high court is cited by sister courts, the more prestigious and influential it is 
presumed to be.  
 However, the terms are conflated. For reasons to be discussed later, I maintain that 
prestige and influence are distinct concepts and am looking to see if prestige translates into 
influence.  I am presuming it does based upon the way the authors conceptualize and conflate the 
terms, but if it does not, I need to explain why.   
Social science definitions tend to associate prestige with influence for individuals or 
collectivities that are in "structured" or "hierarchical" or "ranking" relationships or systems:  
Specifically, we suggest that prestige should be understood as a particular form of social 
power and advantage that is of a symbolic rather than of an economic or political 
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character, and which gives rise to structured relationships of deference, acceptance and 
derogation. (Goldthorpe & Hope, 1972, p 20);  
  
Prestige is an entitlement to deference (Shils [1968] 1994), and as such it has an 
inherently hierarchical quality… The entitlement to deference arises out of respect and 
admiration that are deserved in the sense that they are grounded in the values of the group 
in which the person is esteemed or the role is considered prestigious. (Sandefur, 2004, p. 
383); 
  
 Prestige is a particularly potent basis for the form of power that resides in influence, or 
the ability to get others to do what one wants because others already want to comply with 
one's wishes, even before those wishes are expressed. (Parsons 1963) (Sandefur, 2004, p. 
384); 
 
Basically, prestige is the granting of higher human evaluation an individual or a 
collectivity or a symbol, within the ranking system of other individuals, collectivities, or 
symbols… Above all, it is evident that prestige plays a considerable role in the 
domination-submission process. The degree of conformity is greater the higher the 
prestige of the person or the group seeking to influence others. "(Roueck, 1957) 
 
These definitions do not fully apply to American state high courts because they are formal equals 
and are not in “structured” or “hierarchical” “ranking” relationships or systems in which one state 
Supreme Court wants others “to comply with” its “wishes.” It may be the case that some state Supreme 
Court justices are interested in being seen as prestigious justices, as members of prestigious courts, or 
would be subjectively pleased to be cited by other state supreme courts. But in a formal or objective way, 
this thesis abstracts conclusions about prestige and influence from the objective facts of court decisions 
and citations. Thus, while I assert that the concept of a prestigious state Supreme Court makes sense, the 
social science concept of prestige applies in a somewhat attenuated form when applied to these 
institutions.    
The second form of citation analysis is based upon an examination of courts to assess 
their prestige as determined by law reviews, journals, and other scholarly sources.  I am looking 
to see if assertions of prestige from the legal community translate into influence.  I again assume 
it does if prestige and deference, derogation and influence are similar or equivalent.     
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It should be noted that citation analysis runs the risk of tautology.  For example, is a court 
cited frequently because it is prestigious, or is it prestigious because it frequently cited? 
Merryman (1978) and Kagan, Cartright, Friedman and Wheeler (1978) seem to assume the latter.  
Per Merryman: “Even accounting for the sheer volume of reported decisions does not, however 
provide a full explanation.  There is the additional factor of authority…It may express the 
considered judgment that the judiciary in some states has a stronger tradition and does 
consistently superior work than is true of other states” (Merryman 1978, p.403).  Similarly, 
according to Kagan and Cartright (1978): “…The opinions of such courts (high discretion and 
small caseload) might be well regarded and therefore frequently cited by other courts” (p. 991).  
I avoid this problem by operationalizing prestige based upon academic and legal 
assessments.  As will be explained in detail later, many normative academic articles and legal 
evaluations simply presume that certain courts such as the New Jersey Supreme Court are 
prestigious with no attempt to define the terms. As noted above, and will be discussed below, 
although the terms may be related, they are not synonymous and the empirical studies mistakenly 
conflate them.  I will be examining whether prestige leads to or is an indicator of influence.    
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Chapter  2 
Legal and Constitutional Background 
Before addressing the studies upon which this thesis is based, it is necessary to examine 
basic legal and constitutional issues of interpretation along with the work of the Warren and 
Burger Courts.  The entire concept of the New Judicial Federalism and independent 
interpretation of state constitutions arises out of the dichotomous approaches of those courts 
toward protections for the criminally accused.  
The Warren Cour t 
While there is disagreement over Warren Court jurisprudence, there is little disagreement 
that it was an activist court (Kmiec, 2004).  Both supporters and detractors of the court 
acknowledge this (Kmiec, 2004).   It should be noted that the term “activist” is used as a 
pejorative term by court critics and a term of admiration by supporters (Kmiec, 2004). The 
relevance of the term activist for present purposes is that the decisions in the area of criminal 
procedure which broaden the rights of the accused are widely considered activist, and it is those 
decisions that proponents of the New Judicial Federalism seek to duplicate.  
Some critics associate the Warren Court with an emphasis upon substantive results at the 
expense of constitutional restraints or awareness of the proper role of the court (McFeeley, 
1978).  Kurland (1969) in his article: “Toward a Political Supreme Court” opines that the Warren 
court was acting more like a legislature than a court.  He also debates the pros and cons of: 
“…turning the Supreme Court into a third legislative chamber, or retaining it in the form of a 
judicial body” (p. 20).  Another commentator puts it even more bluntly: “The Warren Court 
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placed greater value on its own policy predilections than on legal reasoning” (Maidment, 1975, 
p. 315). 
 This is particularly true in the area of individual rights where: “The Warren Court, in  
most cases, seemed to come down squarely on the side of progress for individual rights even if 
those decisions were harmful to the principles of federalism” (McFeeley, 1978, p. 12).  This 
approach was strongly opposed by members of the court itself, and most particularly by Justice 
Harlan (Mason, 1966) but the views of the Warren majority carried the day. 
  In order to accomplish its reforms, the court applied certain articles of the Bill of Rights 
to the states that had previously been understood to apply only to the federal government. This 
was the doctrine of incorporation.  The court reasoned that many provisions of the Bill of Rights 
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment which states, in relevant part: “…nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law…”   
The court relied most heavily upon the Due Process Clause in its decisions regarding 
state criminal law (McFeeley, 1978).  Through use of the clause, the court mandated: 
“…stringent protections against compulsory self incrimination (Malloy v Hogan (1964)), and 
illegal searches and seizures (Mapp v Ohio (1961)) as well as guarantees for provision of counsel 
(Gideon v Wainwright (1963))”  (McFeeley, 1978, p. 12).  
Such radical changes provoked praise or criticism depending upon political viewpoint, 
but the Miranda v Arizona (1966) decision provoked the most vehement criticisms, including 
from the dissenting opinions.  For example, the dissenters and numerous commentators maintain 
that the court actually drew most of its rationale from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 
which does not attach until judicial proceedings have commenced (Maidment, 1975; Friendly, 
1965).  “Extension of the assistance of counsel clause to the point of arrest or even to the 
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moment of arrival at the police station would require…radical textual surgery.  The sixth 
amendment concerns ‘criminal prosecutions’ and guarantees an ‘accused’ the assistance of 
counsel ‘for his defense’ (Friendly, 1965, p. 946).  
 The decision also provoked a public outcry and a political backlash (Howard, 1980).  In 
fact, Richard Nixon made the Miranda decision in particular and the Warren Court in general a 
cornerstone of his 1968 campaign (Howard, 1980): 
Appealing to ‘law and order’ sentiments, Nixon complained that the justices were 
weakening the country’s ‘peace forces’ and giving too much ground to the ‘criminal 
forces.’  The first civil right of every American he declared, is to be ‘free from domestic 
violence (Howard, 1980, p. 9).   
 
True to his word, after the election, he appointed four justices who shared his ‘conservative 
philosophy’ (Howard, 1980 p. 9). 
However, the court and its decisions also had staunch defenders. For example, writing in 
1968, Kenneth Pye maintained that there was a: “…disparity between the reality of the criminal 
process and the ideals of civilized conduct to which we as a nation had sworn allegiance” (Pye, 
1968, p. 253).  He was particularly concerned with racial differences in how suspects were 
treated, especially in the Deep South (Pye, 1968).He asserts that: “The Court’s concern with 
criminal procedure can be understood only in the context of the struggle for civil rights” (Pye, 
1968, p. 256).   
This sentiment is echoed by other contemporary commentators as well, such as  William 
Beaney (Beaney, 1968) and Alpheus Thomas Mason (Mason, 1974) The common theme running 
through these commentaries is the necessity for court intervention because something had to be 
done and the coordinate branches of government simply could not be trusted. 
Klarman takes is a step further and maintains that the Warren Court decisions were a 
natural outgrowth of earlier decisions by the court in the period between World War I and World 
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War II when it first began to regulate criminal procedure in some southern states (Klarman, 
2000).  He argues that those cases mark the birth of state criminal procedure cases from the 
Supreme Court, although the Court’s primary motive was to bring justice practices in the South 
more into line with minimal national standards than to work deep changes in state criminal 
procedure.   Per Klarman, state criminal trials for minorities in the South were little more than an 
attempt avoid a lynching, with no procedural protections and a guaranteed guilty verdict 
regardless of actual innocence.  There were also frequent instances of confessions elicited 
through torture (Klarman, 2000).   
 The Supreme Court examined particularly egregious examples in a series of cases and 
determined that criminal procedure must encompass more than a successful attempt to avoid a 
lynching (Klarman, 2000). Klarman maintains that far from being countermajoritarian, the 
decisions reflected northern (and some southern) disgust at the abuse and discrimination in the 
southern states (Klarman, 2000).    
 Ely (1980) maintains that the decisions of the Warren court were not ideological or result 
oriented at all, but merely necessary to make sure everyone had the opportunity for fair and 
proper procedure. “…the constitutional decisions of the Warren Court evidence a deep structure 
significantly different from the value oriented approach favored by the academy” (p74).  He 
concludes that the criminal procedure decisions in particular were process oriented because they 
sought to assure a fair process, open to all, before serious consequences could be imposed (Ely, 
1980).   
 Strauss asserts that Warren court jurisprudence in the realm of criminal procedure was a 
plausible outgrowth of the common law method of constitutional interpretation.  He avers that 
most Supreme Court opinions may acknowledge or refer to a specific Constitutional Amendment 
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or provision, but the bulk of the ruling is an analysis of prior precedent.  Additionally, when the 
precedent is unclear: “…the opinion will make arguments about fairness or good social policy: 
why one result makes more sense than another, why a different ruling would be harmful to some 
important social interest” (Strauss, 2010, p. 33).  He also states that judicial latitude is restrained 
by the prior precedent (Strauss, 2010).   
 In this method of interpretation, the written Constitution serves as a common ground for 
the American people to settle disputes over issues such as the term of the presidency or the 
number of senators per state without the necessity for endless debate and controversy.  The 
American people accept the written Constitution not because not because of the authority of 
those who drafted it, but because it serves this common ground function (Strauss, 2010).   
 A corollary to this is that the written Constitution is to be interpreted according to the 
common ordinary meaning of words as we understand them today, as opposed to what they may 
have meant the time of its drafting.  Thus, it was plausible and defensible for the Warren Court to 
apply the Bill of Rights to the states, despite the original understanding that they would apply 
solely to the federal government. The Bill of Rights served as a common ground for the ruling 
according to the meaning of the words as we understand them today and the decision was 
accepted because it was explicitly tied to the text of the Constitution.   
 It is not my intention to resolve the dispute over Warren Court methodology or results.  
The larger point is that those on both sides of the spectrum acknowledge that the criminal 
procedure decisions were a departure from prior constitutional adjudication, regardless of the 
court’s motivation.  As discussed in the next section, when the Burger court began to chip away 
at those decisions, those in support urged a greater use of state constitutions.    
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The Burger Court 
The court’s criminal procedure trajectory was severely curtailed with the advent of the 
new (Burger) Court that emerged due to Nixon’s appointments. The Burger Court cut back upon 
many of the Warren Court reforms. In response, many of those frustrated by this turn of events 
began urging the use of state courts and state constitutions to expand the rights of the accused.  
The Burger Court basically cut back on the Warren Court’s “nationalization” of the Bill 
of Rights (McFeeley, 1978). Concomitant with this new view of the scope of Constitutional 
protections was a drastic curtailment of access to federal courts.   
In a series of decisions, the Court methodically and inexorably limited federal court 
jurisdiction.  In Tollert v Henderson (1973) the court held that a guilty plea upon advice of 
adequate counsel prevented  habeas review of ostensible constitutional defects which preceded 
the plea, and further ruled that habeas protection was waived when a prisoner bypassed state 
safeguards (McFeeley, 1979).  Similarly, the court found, in Murch v Mottram (1972), that there 
was a “legitimate state interest in orderly proceedings and possibly…federal interest in limiting 
repetitious petitions” and barred habeas review when the petitioner “deliberately bypassed state 
proceedings” (McFeeley, 1979 p. 184).  Finally, the Court ruled, in Picard v Conner (1972) that 
habeas was not available to: “…a petitioner who had not fairly presented his claim for 
consideration by the state’s highest court” (McFeeley , 1979,  p. 184).   
However: “Perhaps the best intimation of the Burger Court’s feelings toward the 
expanded writ came about in Schneckloth v Bustamonte (1973)” (McFeeley, 1979, p. 184).  In a 
concurring opinion by Powell joined by Burger and Rehnquist, the court reconsidered the 
Warren Court opinion in Kaufman v United States (1969) and urged that additional federal 
procedural protections should not be available where a litigant had an opportunity to present 4th 
11 
 
Amendment claims at the state level. The justices did a cost/benefit analysis and concluded that 
various costs such as the lack of finality of a judgment and misallocation of scarce judicial 
resources detracted from the process of administering justice (Schneckloth 1973).     
The court then went on to severely limited habeas review for state prisoners in the case of 
Stone v Powell (1976) (McFeeley, 1979).  Justice Powell, writing for the majority concluded that 
federal review was barred if a defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a 4th 
Amendment claim in the state court (McFeeley, 1979).  The court had now severely curtailed 
federal collateral attack upon state convictions (McFeeley, 1979).  
 This provoked a stinging dissent from Justice Brennan who was joined by Justice 
Marshall.  They maintained that: “…the current court is reversing the entire due process 
revolution of the 1960’s” (McFeeley, 1979, p. 187).  The dissent further argued that the ruling 
was: “’…in keeping with the regrettable trend in barring the federal courthouse to individuals 
with meritorious claims’” (McFeeley, 1979, p. 187 quoting dissenting opinion in Stone).   
Another important case limiting access to federal courts was Younger v Harris (1971), 
which, according to one author, is: “…almost universally understood to have worked a 
revolution in the availability of federal injunctions against state proceedings” (Weinberg, 1977, 
p. 1206).  In Harris the defendant sought a federal injunction against state prosecution under the 
California Criminal Syndicalism Act.  The court refused to grant the injunction reasoning that 
federalism concerns precluded federal court involvement (McFeeley, 1979). Justice Douglas was 
the lone dissenter.  
The Court then continued this trend in a series of subsequent rulings.  Two cases of note 
are Wainright v Sykes (1977) and Teague v Lane (1989).  Wainright held that federal habeas 
corpus review is precluded if the defendant waives state law remedies by failing to comply with 
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state requirements.  In Wainright, the defendant sought to exclude statements made to the police.  
However, he failed to object to their admission at trial as required by Florida law, and the court 
concluded that review of any federal claims was barred.  Teague similarly barred review of a 
defendant's claim that he was denied a fair trial because of the systematic exclusion of blacks 
from the jury, because he did not raise that claim at trial.       
It was obvious to all that the Burger Court was simply not going to allow unfettered 
access to the federal courts anymore and in some instances was taking steps to preclude it 
entirely.   As previously mentioned, this spurred a renewed interest in state courts and state court 
adjudication. 
It is generally agreed that the starting point for this new focus was provided by Justice 
William Brennan.  In 1977, Brennan, the most lively dissenter in most of the Burger Court cases, 
realizing that the federal courts were simply no longer available to carry on the Warren Court 
trajectory published a seminal article, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights 
(Brennan, 1977), which encouraged states to make independent use of their constitutions to grant 
greater protection for criminal suspects and state prisoners than the Supreme Court was willing 
to allow.  
He reviewed major Warren Court decisions regarding segregation, reapportionment, and 
criminal procedure and maintained that the theme of these Bill of Rights rulings is that we need 
greater protection from “arbitrary action by governments” now more than any time in the past.  
He further asserted that the way to achieve these protections is to adhere to the principle that ". . 
. constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally 
construed...” (Brennan, 1977 p. 494 quoting Boyd v United States (1886) and Olmstead v United 
States (1928) (dissenting opinion)). 
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 He next pointed out many rulings increasing the rights of the accused. For example, sixth 
amendment protections were broadened or extended to encompass the rights to speedy and 
public trial, trial by an impartial jury, and compulsory process (Brennan, 1977).  Additionally, 
fifth amendment double jeopardy protections were extended, and “…after decades of police 
coercion, by means ranging from torture to trickery, the privilege against self-incrimination 
became the basis of Miranda v Arizona, requiring police to give warnings to a suspect before 
custodial interrogation"  (Brennan, 1977, p. 494).               
He then catalogued Burger Court rulings which he felt were inappropriate restrictions 
upon Constitutional protections from “arbitrary action by governments.”   Per Justice Brennan, 
under the fourth amendment, the Court has: “…found that the warrant requirement plainly 
appearing … does not require the police to obtain an arrest warrant before arrest, however easy it 
might have been to obtain an arrest warrant”, allowed searches after traffic stops even when there 
is no probable cause, and permitted consent searches irrespective of whether the consent was 
intelligent and knowing (Brennan, 1977, p. 497).  He additionally observed that the court has 
carved out numerous exceptions to the exclusionary rule even if the search violated the fourth 
amendment (Brennan, 1977).   
Further: “The sixth amendment guarantee has fared no better” (Brennan, 1977, p. 497).  
Assistance of counsel is no longer required during pre indictment identification proceedings, and   
“…the Court has countenanced …significant burdens on the constitutional right to jury trial in 
criminal cases” (Brennan, 1977, p. 498).  Finally: “…in the face of our requirement of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the court has upheld the permissibility of less than unanimous jury 
verdicts of guilty” (Brennan, 1977, p. 498).   
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He concluded his observations with commentary on the trend, noted above, of the Burger 
Court restricting access to federal courts.  He maintained that the court was now requiring 
showings in the areas of jurisdiction, justiciability, and remedy which were“probably impossible 
to make” and “barred the federal courthouse door” (Brennan, 1977, p. 498).  Additionally: “… 
the centuries old remedy of habeas corpus was so circumscribed last term as to weaken 
drastically its ability to safeguard individuals from invalid imprisonment”  (Brennan, 1977, p. 
498).  
The above sets the stage for his urging state courts to interpret their constitutions to 
increase the rights of criminal defendants beyond the federal minimum standards. He cited 
several examples of state supreme courts providing greater protection for criminal suspects than 
that mandated by the Supreme Court.  Most relevant for this dissertation, he included the 
Supreme Courts of California, Michigan, and New Jersey. Those individual decisions will be 
examined later.   
     Brennan’s article is a clarion call to state courts to continue expanding the rights of 
criminal defendants via their own constitutions.  However, some scholars had earlier noticed that 
some state supreme courts had already been doing exactly that.  Donald Wilkes (1974, 1974a, 
1974b,) in a series of articles on the new federalism, chronicled what he saw as an emerging 
pattern among select supreme courts to “evade” Burger Court rulings so as to provide greater 
protection to criminal defendants.    
 Similar to Justice Brennan, he begins his analysis by noting what he feels the Burger 
Court had done to the Supreme Court:  “Since the completion of the first article, the Burger 
Court has continued the methodical demolition of the wall of constitutional protection entered 
and strengthened by the Warren Court” (Wilkes, 1975, p. 730). He observes that this new 
15 
 
philosophy set the stage for state courts to “evade” federal court rulings providing less protection 
for criminal suspects (Wilkes, 1974).  Next, he examines several examples of what he terms state 
court “evasions” of Burger Court rulings and arguments for why such evasion was inevitable, 
along with the preferred method to broaden the rights of criminal defendants in the face of an 
increasingly hostile United States Supreme Court.   
 The first series of cases do not actually show state court evasion, but are examples of 
where state court attempts to broaden criminal rights were overruled by the Burger Court. For 
example, In California v Green (1970) the Burger Court overruled a holding by the California 
Supreme Court that use of prior inconsistent statements to impeach violated the sixth 
Amendment (Wilkes, 1974).  Instead, the Court found the use of such statements constitutionally 
permissible (Wilkes, 1974).  
In another California case, California v Byers (1971), the Supreme Court held, again 
contrary to the California Supreme Court, that a criminal statute requiring drivers involved in 
accidents to stop and provide information did not violate the fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination (Wilkes, 1974).  Finally, the Burger Court reversed the Michigan Supreme Court 
and declined to give retroactive application to its ruling involving the double jeopardy clause in 
North Carolina v Pearce (1969) (Wilkes, 1974).   The larger meaning of these cases, of course, 
is that the Supreme Court will provide a certain level of protection to criminal defendants, and 
will rebuff any state court attempts to broaden it under the United States Constitution.   
According to Wilkes, the most promising method available to state courts to “evade” 
Supreme Court decisions is the “adequate state grounds” doctrine.  The adequate state grounds 
doctrine is grounded upon the fact that: “The Supreme Court of the United States generally does 
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not have the power to review a state court’s interpretation of state law” (Bice, 1972, p.750).  This 
fact has led to:  
“…a familiar doctrine: the Supreme Court will not review decisions of state courts which 
are based upon ‘adequate state grounds’, even though the state court may have also 
decided a question of federal law.  Also, under this doctrine, the Supreme Court will not 
review a federal question which the state court has avoided, if the reason supporting the 
court’s failure to decide the federal question is ‘adequate’ (Bice, 1972, p. 751).   
 
In other words, a state court is free to expand the rights of criminal defendants, and its ruling is 
immune from federal review, if it is based upon an adequate state ground.  This is another 
obvious reason to rely exclusively upon state law.  
 The criteria for determining the existence of an adequate state ground was enunciated by 
the United States Supreme Court in Michigan v Long (1983).  Prior to Long, there was no 
consistent approach for determining the existence of an adequate state ground (Long 1983) and 
the Long case presented a unified approach.  Under Long, if a state court uses both state and 
federal law, and it is not clear from the opinion which one controls, it will be presumed to be 
federal law unless the court clearly states that it is relying upon state law (Long 1983) Thus, as 
long as the state court clearly specifies that its ruling hinges upon state law, the decision is barred 
from federal judicial review. 
 As stated above, some state courts had been taking full advantage of this doctrine in 
reaction to Burger Court rulings, and Wilkes cites numerous examples which include, but are not 
limited to, California, Michigan, and New Jersey.  One exemplar is the Supreme Court of 
Hawaii.  In one case, the court held, contrary to the Burger Court, that statements obtained in 
violation of Miranda, are inadmissible for purposes of impeachment, nothing that:  
(T)his court is the final arbiter of the meaning of the provisions of the Hawaii 
Constitution.  Nothing prevents our constitutional drafters from fashioning greater 
protections for criminal defendants than those given by the United States Constitution. 
(Wilkes, 1974, p. 438 citing State v Santiago (1971) 
17 
 
 
In another context, the Hawaii Court similarly declined to follow the United States Constitution 
as interpreted by the Burger Court, and suppressed evidence obtained from a woman arrested 
without a warrant and searched incident to arrest at the police station (Wilkes, 1974).  The 
Burger Court had determined that someone arrested had “no reasonable expectation of privacy”, 
but the Hawaii Court again chose to grant greater protection under its state constitution (Wilkes, 
1974, p. 878).  The court then concluded that it was free to reach such a decision under state law 
as long as it did not infringe upon any federal right (Wilkes, 1974).  
 As previously stated, and most relevant for the purposes of this thesis, Wilkes also found 
examples from the Supreme Courts of California, Michigan, and New Jersey. Many of those 
decisions were also noted by Brennan, such as the New Jersey case of State v Johnson (1975), 
the California case of People v Brisendine (1975), and the Michigan case of People v Jackson 
(1974), and will be discussed later. 
 As can be seen, state courts became more fertile ground for scholarly review because of 
the twin factors of some state courts wishing to expand the rights of criminal defendants beyond 
what the Burger Court would allow, and Justice Brennan’s plea for them to do so.  
New Judicial Federalism 
Independent Interpretation of State Constitutions 
In order to understand the New Judicial Federalism, it is important to examine the issue 
of independent state constitutional interpretation generally.  The most relevant point is that no 
one questions the right of state courts to independently interpret their constitutions (Johansen, 
1976).   “All agree that the Federal Constitution in no way constrains state courts in interpreting 
their local constitutions; that the federal Supreme Court has no power to force state courts to alter 
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these interpretations…” (Maltz, 1987, p. 435).  The debate invariably focuses upon whether it is 
appropriate to do so (Johansen, 1976).   
Indeed, until the incorporation of several articles of the Bill of Rights to the states, state 
constitutions provided the exclusive remedy against state government action (Hudnut, 1985).    
Many state constitutions and state constitutional rights came before the drafting of the federal 
constitution and the Bill of Rights was exclusively applicable to the federal government (Hudnut, 
1985).  It was presumed that state constitutions provided sufficient protection against local 
authority (Linde, 1980; Abrahamson, 1992). Additionally, those states admitted subsequent to 
the adoption of the Federal Bill of Rights used other state constitutions as the model for their 
bills of rights (Linde, 1980).  
Moreover, most cases involving individual rights are the province of state courts, and: 
“…the vast bulk of criminal litigation in this country is handled by state courts.” (Abrahamson, 
1992, p. 27) Further, as a practical matter, if the state constitution protects a right or disposes of 
an issue, there is no need for federal involvement because there is no federal claim (Linde, 
1980).   
In fact, Linde (1980) argues that the return to state constitutional interpretation, far from 
being any kind of radical change, is merely a return to the state of jurisprudence before the 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights.  He observes that attorneys arguing before state tribunals 
regularly relied upon state law until the advent of incorporation and simply fell out of the habit.  
The new and exclusive focus was on the application of federal constitutional rights to the states  
The emphasis is now shifting back to state courts and constitutions due to decisions of the 
Burger court (Abrahamson, 1992).   One of the main criticisms of this new emphasis is that it is 
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too "result oriented" and unprincipled.  However, proponents advance numerous justifications 
for independent state court review.  
The first justification focuses upon the uniqueness of each state and its constitution. In a 
nutshell: "States have different histories and cultures; their citizens hold different rights 
important", and the people of a particular state enshrine those differences into their state 
constitutions (Weiss and Bennett, 1993, p. 233).  Concomitantly, a court which fails to 
independently interpret its state constitution by taking these differences into account, fails to give 
a "…true, full meaning to the constitution" and ultimately fails the people (Long, 2006, p. 53).  
A second justification is the so-called 'laboratories of democracy' argument (Long, 2006).   
This argument, which borrows heavily from the dissenting opinion of Louis Brandeis in the case 
of New State Ice Company v Liebemann (1932), asserts that independent state constitutional 
interpretation is a good thing because different states may examine the results from an individual 
state and determine of it would work for that state.  In other words, individual states provide a 
guide to other states as to what policies will ultimately succeed and fail (Long, 2006).     
A final justification relies upon judicial efficiency (Long, 2006).  It is argued that state 
constitutional interpretations based upon an adequate and independent state ground relieve: 
"…that court and the parties the time and expense of further appellate litigation." because the 
decision is immune to Supreme Court review (Long, 2006, p. 57).   Any other method of 
interpretation invites further review at the federal level (Long, 2006).  There are responses to all 
of these justifications, but the point is that there are arguments for independent state 
constitutional interpretation that are neutral.   
Thus, there are basically two competing schools of thought regarding the propriety of the 
New Judicial Federalism.  The first school presents its justifications based upon the uniqueness 
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of state constitutions, the 'laboratories of democracy" argument, considerations of judicial 
efficiency, and federalism. The rival school highlights the ostensible desire for particular results. 
(increasing the rights of criminal suspects beyond federal minimums using the state constitution) 
  It is the emphasis upon results that has prompted much of the scholarly as well as 
judicial criticism of the New Judicial Federalism.  The success of state constitutional claims,  
barred from federal review: “…has resulted in charges that state courts are evading Supreme 
Court doctrine and engaging in unprincipled, result-oriented use of their state constitutions” 
(Johansen, 1976, p. 297). Similarly: “Recent reliance upon the California Constitution by our 
state supreme court has been viewed as result-oriented” (Dukmejian and Thompson, 1979, p. 
989). In fact, as noted by Johansen: “The most vocal critics have been (dissenting) judges” 
(Johansen, 1976, p. 297).  
This raises a question. Assuming arguendo that some state courts are interested in 
expanding constitutional protections, why is that necessarily a bad thing? As discussed earlier, 
state constitutional interpretations may only expand or broaden the rights of suspects and the 
accused. What is the harm in expanding the rights of criminal suspects at the state level?   The 
main objection stresses the desirability of uniformity between state and federal constitutional 
protections (Hudnut, 1985).  The possibility of different results in different cases seems 
acceptable in areas of common law and statutory interpretation, but: "… appear more repugnant 
or unfair in the constitutional area and especially in the criminal area" (Hudnut, 1985, p. 92).  
There is increased or double protection for the accused,"…but it is troubling that such double 
protection will result in different constitutional rights for citizens of different states" (Hudnut, 
1985, p. 92).  It may also: "…reinforce the popular perception of the legal system as being 
capricious, hyper-technical, or unfair" (Hudnut, 1985, p. 92).  
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Additionally, in cases involving both state and federal agencies, there is the possibility 
for confusion as to which procedural standard applies (Hudnut 1985).  Higher state standards 
will not apply to federal agencies (Hudnut, 1985).  Thus, in a joint investigation involving the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Drug Enforcement Administration, there is the danger of 
disarray for the officers involved and the those prosecutors (Hudnut, 1985)    
Regardless of its authenticity, it is those courts that engage in such independent 
interpretation, which are, as noted below, considered by segments of the legal community to be 
the most prestigious.  With this combination of accolades and encouragement to expand rights 
under state constitutions, I would expect to see sister state courts routinely citing and following 
decisions of the California and New Jersey Supreme Courts which increase the rights of the 
accused.  The empirical prestige literature relies upon a raw citation count, and higher counts 
translate into greater prestige and influence. The normative literature associates prestige (at least 
in part) with the New Judicial Federalism. If one of the reasons these courts are prestigious is 
because of their expansion of rights of the accused, it follows that a significant percentage of 
those cases would be cited and followed if prestige equals influence.     
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Chapter 3 
Horizontal Federalism and Policy Dissemination 
 
Empir ical Studies 
 
 In political science, studies of Horizontal Federalism focus upon policy diffusion among 
the 50 states, and the vast bulk of studies are in the legislative arena (Savage, 1985) (Karch, 
2007).  Two seminal articles are by Walker (1969) and Gray (1973).     
Jack Walker made a pioneering study of legislative horizontal federalism in his article: 
“The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States” (Walker, 1969).  In it, he examined 
the adoption of a new policy by a state and then traced its adoption by sister states.  He looked at 
various factors such as wealth, party competition, and institutional components in explaining the 
propensity of certain states to adopt innovative policies.  He then analyzed the elements involved 
with the dissemination of that policy and found strong evidence of regionalism and emulation as 
explanatory factors. There has been a plethora of articles on policy diffusion across disciplines 
since (See Savage, 1985). 
  The most extensive scholarly literature in the area of diffusion focuses on the diffusion 
of policies among the 50 states (Karch, 2007).  As of 1985, there were 60 studies across 
disciplines. (mostly political science) (Savage, 1985).  Scholars have examined factors affecting 
why policy diffusion occurs (geographical proximity, imitation, and competition) and what is 
being diffused (national organizations, policy entrepreneurs, and national government 
intervention) (Karch, 2007).  Karch (2007) has a good summary of the current state of the 
research with an extensive references page.          
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One article worth mentioning is “Innovations in the States: A Diffusion Study” by 
Virginia Gray in 1973 (Gray, 1973).  Using various sources, she examined the innovation and 
adoption of policies in the three main areas of education, welfare, and civil rights. Similar to 
Walker, she was trying to determine how innovations diffuse among the states, why some states 
are more likely to innovate than others, and whether there were patterns of innovation (Gray, 
1973).  Using regression analysis and employing quadratic and linear models, she found that 
emulation of adopting states by non-adopting states was a large explanatory factor.  She further 
concluded that first-adopting states were wealthier and more competitive than non-adopting 
states, and that innovation generally tended to be time and issue specific.   
In comparison, there are relatively few studies of horizontal federalism involving the 
courts and policy diffusion, and even fewer which focus upon the prestige of the court or courts. 
I am attempting to fill that void.      
Studies of policy diffusion among state courts will typically examine the diffusion of 
legal precedent as well as policy innovation and I will discuss them chronologically. Canon and 
Baum (1981) analyzed the diffusion of new doctrines in the law of torts among the various state 
supreme courts. Using regional legal reporters, they counted the first innovation and then 
subsequent adoptions by sister states. They initially assigned innovation scores from 1.00 to 0.00 
based upon the amount of time between the first adoption and one year after the last adoption.  
They then compared those scores using variables such as the legislative innovativeness of the 
state, census region, characteristics of the state, and characteristics of the court.  
They found little evidence of political ideology, political culture, judicial 
professionalism, or regionalism on the adoption or non-adoption of the ruling by sister states.  
Instead, they posited that since state courts are reactive institutions (unlike legislatures, they 
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cannot initiate policy but are dependent upon litigants) a large portion of tort law innovation and 
diffusion was idiosyncratic, and that was likely true of other areas of the law as well (Canon and 
Baum, 1981). 
 In “The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A Study of State Supreme Courts”, Caldeira 
(1984) examined patterns of citation among the various state supreme courts and the various 
reasons why a state supreme court may choose to follow a sister court even though its decisions 
are not binding (Caldeira, 1984).  He examined the legal reporters for the various legal regions 
and counted the citations to sister courts   He found several elements affecting that decision such 
as the relative prestige of the high court (to be discussed in detail later) similarity of political 
cultures and the social diversity of the environment (Caldeira, 1984). 
By contrast, Harris (1985) looked at sister court citation of precedent from 1870 to 1970.    
Using a data set provided by Cartright, Friedman, Kagan and Wheeler (1978), he found that 
although social ecological similarity did not affect such citations, cultural regionalism 
(undefined) had a pronounced effect (Harris, 1985). He further found greater citation flowing 
from states that are more populous to less populated, and more urban to less urban, but that this 
was mediated by a number of factors other than cultural regionalism, such as legislative 
innovativeness and judicial professionalism (Harris, 1985).   
Hofler (1994) examined the diffusion of “right to die” cases among the various states.     
Drawing upon various secondary sources, he examined the initial adoption and diffusion of 
doctrine involving the right to die among the state supreme courts (Hoefler, 1994).  He found, 
contrary to other policy areas, a large amount of homogeneity and reliance upon the federal 
constitution and federal case law (Hoefler, 1994).   
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Lutz (1997) narrowed his focus to eight of the tort innovations examined by Canon and 
Baum.   He examined a tort innovation from the first adoption through its diffusion among the 
various state courts, up until the final adoption as of 1975.  Using multiple regression analysis, 
he was attempting to determine if there were any regional leaders among the states.  He 
concluded that there were regional leaders among the state courts that were early adopters of tort 
doctrines (Lutz, 1997).  
 While there have been many empirical articles that touch upon the question of the 
prestige of state supreme courts through an examination of horizontal federalism, the two that 
directly address the question are: Judicial Influence by Rodney Mott (1936), and On the 
Reputation of State Supreme Courts (1983) by Gregory Caldeira. Both studies rely upon citation 
analysis to reach their conclusions. 
It is necessary to define “citation analysis.” A citation is simply a reference by a scholar 
to the ideas or quotations of someone else regarding that authors own writing. (Shapiro, 1985).   
Those references are usually in the form of a footnote or citation (Shapiro, 1985).  A “citation 
index” is an organized list of those references or citations which is used by others to access the 
information (Shapiro, 1985).   
The first modern citation index was the Shepard’s citation system used by lawyers in 
legal research (Shapiro, 1985).  Shepard’s tracks all citations of a given case or statute by other 
courts and indicates whether the case was overruled.  Attorneys and scholars use this index to 
assist in research and to determine whether the case is still valid (Shapiro, 1985).   That is the 
purpose of the Shepard’s index.  Other disciplines followed the Shepard’s example and put 
together indexes of citations in the fields of medicine, science, social science, and the humanities 
(Shapiro, 1985)     
26 
 
Citation analysis involves using a list of citations for reasons other than information 
retrieval.   For example, using computers, scholars have: “…studied the history and structure of 
science by mapping networks of authors, calculated the ‘half life’ (rate of obsolescence) of 
scientific literature, and otherwise analyzed the nature of scholarly communication” (Shapiro, 
1985, p. 1541).  More importantly, scholars have also used the frequency of citation by 
colleagues as a proxy for the prestige, productivity or quality of scientists and their work 
(Shapiro 1985).  As evidenced by Mott and Caldiera and will be discussed further in the methods 
section, it is a technique used in the area of public law as well.  
 Mott employed various methods such as a count of casebook citations and surveys of law 
professors, but, most relevant for purposes of this paper, he also looked at the amount of times a 
state supreme court is cited by sister courts in a given year and then ranks them from lowest to 
highest based upon the number of citations.  As of 1920, California, New Jersey, and Michigan 
ranked   fourth, eighth and twelfth respectively.  He also then did a composite score combining 
all the elements and ranked California fifth, New Jersey fourth and Michigan eighth. He 
presumes that prestige and influence are similar or the same: 
It is axiomatic that some supreme courts are more influential than others.  A dictum by 
 one judge may carry more weight than a decision by another.  Anyone who has studied 
 the opinions of our highest courts is constantly assigning values to them, and the 
 combination of these impressions may determine the relative standing of these tribunals 
 for that individual.  That this process of appreciation or depreciation is usually 
 unconscious, and frequently irrational, does not make the prestige which results from 
 it any less real or potent a factor. (Mott, 1936, p. 295) 
 
In 1983, Calderia undertook a citation analysis and compared the year 1975 to the 
rankings from Mott’s study (Caldeira, 1983). He went beyond a simple citation count per-se and 
did calculations yielding an expected citation score from each court and then compared it with 
the actual citation count (Calderia, 1983).  As of 1975, California ranked number one, New 
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Jersey number three, and Michigan number ten in terms of sister court citation. (Calderia, 1983). 
He then did a multiple regression analysis and found that political ideology was a large 
determining factor for a high citation count and specifically determined that: “…it appears that 
state supreme courts in progressive states garnered more indications of deference than did high 
benches in more conservative jurisdictions” (Calderia, 1983, p. 101). Although a more 
sophisticated procedure, it was still based upon a raw citation count for a single year. 
He similarly operationalized prestige and influence as being similar or synonymous: 
These citations-construed as deference or derogation-yield very handy and non-reactive 
indicators of hierarchies of prestige between and among the highest appellate courts of 
the several states. (Caldiera, 1983, p. 84); 
 
Borrowing from the social science definitions mentioned above he defines prestige as: 
 
a particular form of social power and advantage that is of a symbolic rather than an 
economic or political character and which gives rise to structured relationships of 
deference, acceptance, and derogation. (Caldiera, 1983, p. 85) 
 
Additionally, judgments about prestige are: “’…subjective responses to particular social 
positions that are rooted in generally shared values’” (Caldiera, 1983, p 85).   
Both studies rely upon a raw citation count. There is no indication in either study of the 
areas of law involved, whether the citation was a dissent or concurrence, or whether the case was 
followed or part of a string citation.  Additionally, there is no indication of whether the law of 
that particular state applied to the legal matter, such as in an interstate custody dispute, or 
whether a party cited the case in support of its position and the court simply responded. This is 
an inherent weakness in relying upon such an approach. 
In fact, Walsh (1997) questions the utility of using raw citation counts to reach any 
conclusions.  He points to: “…consistent empirical findings that the majority of cites are of the 
non-substantive “’string’” variety (Walsh, 1997, p. 338).  He also takes into account: “…the 
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well-taken criticism of the failure of researchers to differentiate between types of citations…” by 
distinguishing “’strong’” and “’weak’” citations (Walsh, 1997, p. 324).    He further asks: “Are 
citations meaningful indicators of intercourt communication and influence, little more than post 
hoc rationalization and attempts at legitimation, or something else?” (Walsh, 1997, p. 337).    
Walsh (1997) does not operationalize prestige per-se, but notes that prior studies 
associate prestigious courts with the frequency of sister court citation.   He then examined why a 
sister court may cite a court and determined that it may be influenced by that court or is 
attempting to legitimate its decision. He focused exclusively upon the doctrine in question (in 
this instance wrongful discharge cases) as opposed to any tangential issues, and applied a three 
element criteria for the citation including length or direct quotation (Walsh, 1997). He examined 
157 decisions from the fifty states and the District of Columbia, and concluded that the majority 
of cites were of the “’weak’” variety (Walsh, 1997).    
Similarly, Dear and Jessen (2007) note the problem of overinclusiveness. (a citation may 
be part of a long string, neutral, or cited for some other purpose) and attempt to address some of 
the concerns mentioned above.  In “Followed Rates” and Leading State Cases, 1940-2005”, the 
authors only count cases that were cited and followed by sister courts over the period of 1940-
2002.  They do this by tabulating the number of times that a Shepherd’s citation indicates that the 
case was followed.   According to their results, California ranks number one. 
 Although a step in the right direction, this approach also presents problems. First, it 
relies upon the accuracy of the Shepherd’s categorization, which the authors themselves 
acknowledge is not always reliable. The authors admit that the Shepherd’s citations involve 
subjective judgment, and they found instances of cases they would have coded differently. (Dear 
and Jessen, 2007)   Additionally, there is no way to tell whether it is a string citation, cited by a 
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party and addressed by the court, or even pertaining to the main issues involved in the case. At 
the end of the article, the authors sum up the cases most followed over those years in areas of law 
such as torts and criminal law and procedure (Dear and Jessen, 2007).   
They similarly operationalize prestige as synonymous with influence.  They discuss prior 
articles employing citation analysis and refer to: “…a few older studies that analyzed 
comparative influence of courts by measuring how frequently various courts are cited by 
others.”, and conclude that high citation is equivalent to comparatively high influence. (Dear and 
Jessen, 2007, p. 687)       
In his study of citations to the United States Supreme Court (Johnson, 1986) makes 
several important points regarding the use of raw citation counts or relying upon the accuracy of 
Shepherd’s Citations.  First, 
 …a large number of citations were mere mentions in the majority opinions and had little 
or no direct relevance to the issues involved in the later decision.  This large number of 
non-substantive treatments should give pause to researchers who indiscriminately count 
citations without consideration of whether they carry any meaning.  (Johnson, 1986, p. 
546) 
 
Second, referring to reliance upon the accuracy of Shepherd’s citations, he observes that 
inaccuracy is a risk taken by any researcher “…who chooses to rely on a secondary data source 
whether it is the Congressional Quarterly, the Book of States, or Shepherd’s Citations.”  
(Johnson, 1981, p. 753 n 4). He further asserts that even if the Shepherd’s citations are accurate, 
it is still no substitute for actually reading the cases as there may be multiple issues involved and 
there is no indication if the citation is for a procedural or substantive matter. (Johnson, 1981)   
Glick (1991) also expressed concerns in his article: “Policymaking and State Supreme 
Courts.” In it, he traced the subsequent citation history of numerous cases involving the right to 
die, including the seminal case of:  In the Matter of Karen Ann Quinlan (1976).  He indeed found 
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courts that relied upon the precedent, but also discovered that a simple citation count did not 
necessarily show prestige and influence.  
If we were to infer leadership in terms of frequency of citation, the Massachusetts court’s 
heavy use of the Quinlan
 
 decision would lead us to classify Massachusetts as following 
New Jersey.  It did in part, but the content of Massachusetts policy also differed in 
important ways, suggesting that even very heavy citation may not indicate clear policy 
direction or the influence of one court over another. (Glick, 1991, p. 113-114) 
 Indeed, even Caldieira (1984) admits that there is a possible problem with not 
differentiating between positive and negative citations, but asserts, without evidence, that 
appellate judges usually refer to their colleagues in an approving manner. Based upon that 
assertion, he concludes that it is not necessary to differentiate.  I found to the contrary.   
 Clearly, there are major disadvantages in relying upon a raw citation count conflating 
prestige and influence. A citation may be a part of a long string citation, a post-hoc 
rationalization, neutral, negative or cited for any number of purposes. Additionally, reliance on 
Shepard’s citations presents its own problems. Shepard’s citations involve subjective judgment 
and there will likely be numerous instances where the researcher will disagree with the coding.  
Further, there is no way to tell if the citation is substantive or procedural. Prior work can tell us 
how many times a court is cited, which may be an indicator of prestige, but taking into account 
the problems noted above, is it an indication of influence as well?  Based upon the empirical 
studies utilizing raw citation counts, it certainly should be and I will proceed with that 
assumption.   
Normative Evaluations and the New Judicial Federalism 
One of the ways I am operationalizing prestige is esteem in segments of the legal 
community. The normative literature (defined as assertions of prestige without empirical 
evidence) discussing the prestige of the various courts does not define the term, but associates it 
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with liberal activism or innovation. It similarly equates a loss of prestige with failing to continue 
issuing such decisions or overruling prior ones. For purposes of this thesis, I am narrowly 
defining that as the development of new legal doctrine under state constitutions (New Judicial 
Federalism).   
For example, In State Supreme Courts in State and Nation, Tarr and Porter (1988) make 
the following assertions regarding the New Jersey Supreme Court: “The court currently enjoys a 
national reputation for progressivism, innovation, and solicitude for individual rights” (Tarr and 
Porter, 1988, p. 66); “Since World War II the New Jersey Supreme Court has assumed a role of 
leadership in the development of legal doctrine, thereby earning itself a national reputation for 
activism and liberal reformism” (Tarr and Porter, 1988, p. 184); “Taken together, the picture that 
emerges is of a court that has eagerly embraced opportunities to promulgate policy for the state 
and doctrine for the nation, confident of its own abilities and of the legitimacy of the activist 
posture it has adopted” (Tarr and Porter, 1988, p. 185); “…the New Jersey Supreme Court seems 
to exemplify …the activist ‘lighthouse’ courts that have assumed a leadership role in national 
legal development” (Tarr and Porter, 1988, p. 268).  
In “The New Jersey Supreme Court 1948-1998: Fifty Years of Independence and 
Activism” Wefing (1997) asserts that:  
In the last fifty years, the New Jersey Supreme Court has attained a reputation as one of 
the leading state supreme courts in the United States.  This reputation has been noted by 
numerous scholar and authors…  (Wefing, 1997, p. 701).  
 
As proof, he relies upon numerous quotes including the following: “The New Jersey Supreme 
Court has a history of being a leader in the development of state constitutional doctrine”; and 
“The New Jersey Supreme Court …has been compared to the Warren court due to its desire to 
effectuate social change” (Wefing, 1997,  p. 701 n.1).  He also notes: 
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Additionally, the court has enthusiastically embraced the New Federalism movement.  As 
the United States Supreme Court has become more conservative in recent years, many 
state courts have chosen to use their own constitutions to grant greater rights than given 
under the United States Constitution.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has regularly done 
this. The New Jersey Supreme Court has granted greater rights to defendants under the 
New Jersey search and seizure provision than the United States Supreme Court has given 
under the Fourth Amendment. (Wefing, 1997,  p. 705) 
 
Russello, in “The New Jersey Supreme Court: New Directions?” maintains that: “The 
New Jersey Supreme Court has built a reputation as an intellectually rigorous and forcefully 
progressive state supreme court” (Russello, 2002, p. 655).  He further asserts that the court from 
1979-1996 under the leadership of Chief Justice Robert Wilentz was a stellar example of the 
“new federalism” urged by Justice Brennan (Russello, 2002).    
According to Oks in “Independence in the Interim: The New Jersey Judiciary’s Lost 
Legacy”: “…since 1947, the New Jersey Supreme Court has served as a model for the nation…” 
(Oks 2011, p. 132 quoting Etish 2010).  Additionally, Oks refers to: “The Court’s national 
reputation as a judicial leader…” (Oks,  2011,  p. 132).   
Referring to early innovations in right to die cases, Glick (1991) maintains: “It probably 
is not a coincidence that supreme courts in New Jersey and Massachusetts produced distinctive 
policies early in the process-especially New Jersey, which appears on every list of innovative or 
prestigious courts” (p. 111).  
Statements regarding the Michigan Supreme Court include the following: It was 
apparently undistinguished until the 1970’s when it gained a reputation for activism (Schneider, 
2008). “…California, New Jersey, and Michigan have been the subject of extensive analysis.  
They are also regarded as the most activist and innovative state supreme courts in the nation”  
(Hagan, 1988, p. 97).  “The Michigan Supreme Court enjoyed a reputation for activism and 
innovation in recent decades.  The Court took an active role in the development of civil liberties 
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issues and tort law innovations” (Parker, 1996, p. 345).  It was during this period that the court 
overturned precedents in the areas of criminal law, torts, and contracts, granting greater 
protections for suspects, broader liability for alleged tortfeasors, and allowing the court to 
determine whether a contractual clause was ‘”reasonable’” (Schneider, 2008).   
After 1998, when the court began overturning some of the above-mentioned precedents, 
it was accused of “judicial politics,” conservative activism, and reaching “desired” or “intended” 
results (Delaney, 2002, p. 784 n 22; Miller, 2006).  One commentator even concluded that: 
“…the transparent efforts of the Michigan Supreme Court to reach conservative results that limit 
and weaken human rights protection, lend strong credence to the argument that the court is 
engaging in unprecedented activism toward the end of reducing civil rights protection and 
increasing governmental power over individual liberty” (Serra, 2004,  p. 959).    
The most frequently cited law review article-Stare Decisis v The “New Majority” : The 
Michigan Supreme Court’s Practice of Overruling Precedent by Sarah K Delaney, maintains 
that the court had a conservative political agenda when it overruled numerous precedents as 
opposed to fidelity to a philosophy of “textualism” or “originalism” (Delaney, 2006).  As noted 
above, Nelson Miller intimates that the majority was exercising “’raw power’” and engaging in 
‘”judicial politics” in overturning prior decisions (Miller, 2006).  
California statements include:  
Long before the controversial appointment of Bird in 1977, the court had acquired a 
reputation as the nation’s premier state court, largely on the basis of its innovative, 
scholarly, and bold leadership in the fields of constitutional, criminal, and tort law. 
(Blum, 1991, p. 48);  
 
“The California court, considered to be the most prestigious in the nation has a history of civil 
rights activism” (Porter, 1978, p. 57); 
“The court’s reputation for greatness dates back to 1940 …” (Blum, 1991, p. 49); 
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“It was considered to be the premier state supreme court basically because of all the innovative 
opinions that would come from California” (Blum, 1991, p. 50). 
After the ouster of Chief Justice Rose Bird came the following evaluations: “Toward a 
Radical Middle-Has a Great Court Become Mediocre?”(Blum, 1991) and “Modeling the Garden- 
How New Jersey Built the Most Progressive State Supreme Court, and What California Can  
Learn.” (Mulcahy, 1999)The former article contains quotes such as; “…the California Court has 
been dislodged as the most “”prestigious” state court by the New Jersey Supreme Court, long 
known for its innovative record in such areas as exclusionary zoning and school finance”  (Blum, 
1991, p. 50-51).  The latter article maintains that California had a great national reputation until 
it went from “progressive to stagnant”   and that: “Although the California Supreme Court 
remains sound in stature, clearly the progressive era of judicial policymaking, activist decisions, 
and national prominence is over” (Mulchay, 2001 p. 863-864 emphasis added). 
Additionally: 
Even before the appointment of Chief Justice Rose Bird in1977, ‘the court had acquired 
the reputation as the nation's premier state court, largely on the basis of its innovative, 
scholarly and bold leadership in the fields of constitutional, criminal and tort law’. Now 
with Chief Justice Lucas at the helm since Bird was unseated in 1986, the court is 
entrenched in its conservative nature and its mainstream posture (Pease, 1994, p. 109-
110). 
 
Similarly: 
 
During his 19-year tenure on the Supreme Court, 14 years as its chief, Ron George 
successfully re-established the preeminence of California’s highest court as one of the 
leading state courts in the country. The court’s national reputation and prominence had 
taken a steep dive in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the failure of three justices to 
win their retention elections in 1986 further damaged the court's prestige and credibility. 
In the aftermath of the 1986 election debacle, the court swung hard to the right (Kelso 
2010).    
 
As can be seen, one innovation frequently mentioned is the New Judicial Federalism or 
expanding the rights of the accused.   Additional statements include, but are not limited to: 
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The movement that Brennan celebrated and sought to nurture was advancing in several 
states. By almost any measure, however, the California Supreme Court was setting the 
pace. Already considered one of the most activist and influential state courts in the nation 
due to its innovations in tort law, California's high court now sought to lead a similar 
revolution in state constitutional rights. (Miller, 2013, p. 2065); 
 
Throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, the court issued a long series of landmark 
decisions expanding state constitutional rights. While the California Supreme Court took 
the lead in expanding rights beyond federal constitutional minimums, enthusiasm for the 
movement has varied from state to state. Over time, the supreme courts of New Jersey 
and Massachusetts have competed with California for leadership of the new judicial 
federalism… (Miller, 2013, p. 2066);   
 
In 1972, the California Supreme Court effectively launched the rights revolution in state 
constitutional law through its decision in People v. Anderson. In Anderson, the court 
declared that capital punishment violated the state constitution's prohibition on cruel or 
unusual punishments (Miller, 2013,  p. 2070);  
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court responded to Brennan's call and, in some cases, 
construed the New Jersey Constitution to afford greater rights to those accused of crime 
than under the federal Constitution. Most notably, the New Jersey court interpreted New 
Jersey's own constitution to provide broader rights in search and seizure cases than the 
Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
(Mulchay, 2000); 
 
"In addition to search and seizure issues, the New Jersey Court also provides greater protection 
against self-incrimination than certain federal decisions" (Mulcahy, 2000,  p. 868); 
 
By relying on state, rather than federal, law, the New Jersey Supreme Court protects 
criminal defendants where the U.S. Supreme Court is unwilling to and, at the same time, 
insulates its decisions from scrutiny by the federal Court. (Mulcahy, 2000,  p. 869); 
 
In the exercise of its constitutional power to establish rules of evidence applicable to 
judicial proceedings, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that, barring exigent 
circumstances, a suspect should have the right to request and obtain counsel at 
identification (Abrahamson, 1985,  p. 1164); 
 
Referring to the New Judicial Federalism, Latzer (1991) concludes that California and 
New Jersey are among the top 10 state supreme courts relying upon state constitutions to grant 
greater protections to criminal defendants.   
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Regarding the use of state constitutions to expand protections for criminal defendants, 
Williams asserts: "… it's a debate that has its origins here in New Jersey, in the Wilentz court, 
and maybe ultimately it will be resolved here (Williams, 1997,  p.  838); 
"In becoming the first state court to reject Bustamonte (and applying a more rigorous 
consent search standard than the United States Supreme Court) under its state constitution, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court lead the way for other courts to follow” (Williams, 2000,  p. 10). 
This list is illustrative and not exhaustive.   
  The normative literature neither operationalizes nor defines prestige or reputation.  It 
simply asserts that certain courts have great reputations or are prestigious based upon (at least in 
part) expanding the rights of the accused and that the prestige fades if they cease to do so.   I 
presume reputation or prestige based upon the empirical studies ranking courts and the normative 
evaluations.  My approach differs from the empirical studies because I actually read and evaluate 
the cases and categorize them based upon whether they are followed, part of a string cite, not 
followed… and based upon the area of law involved.  I am looking to see if the prestige 
translates into influence.  If it does not, I need to explain why.   
There is clearly a gap in the literature. The empirical and normative literature assumes 
that some courts are more prestigious than others and this prestige results in being cited by sister 
courts.  I attempt to shed more light on the question by going beyond raw citation counts to 
analyze the context in which the citation appears.  This requires reading the cases to determine 
whether the citation to a sister court affects the decision in a substantive manner.  When a court 
cites a sister court, it can be inferred (or at least is inferred by the empirical studies) that the 
original decision influenced the subsequent decision. However, if the citation is not followed or 
is merely part of a long string citation, there is no ground for inferring influence.   
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  Chapter 4 
Hypothesis and Methods 
     Previous studies have found substantial evidence of policy diffusion at the level of 
state legislatures, executive branches and policy entrepreneurs, but there has been less effort at 
discerning whether policy diffusion happens by way of state courts. 
 When scholars do examine this issue, they typically have not cast their works as studies 
of horizontal federalism but rather as studies of whether some state supreme courts are more 
likely to influence decisions in other state supreme courts. In general, this research has found that 
some state supreme courts are more influential than others.  Three states that consistently ranked 
as influential are California, Michigan, and New Jersey. 
    However, there are several aspects of these studies that make a conclusion about 
judicial policy diffusion problematic. First, they sometimes fail to distinguish between prestige 
and influence, treating the two terms as synonymous. For example Mott’s article on judicial 
prestige is titled “Judicial Influence” Caldiera operationalizes prestige in terms of deference or 
derogation.  Dear and Jessen equate a high citation count with prestige and influence.  
Second    they often operationalize influence as a high citation rate, without 
differentiating between cites that are substantive and those such as string cites that may be 
characterized as trivial.  If a substantial portion of citations are part of long string citations, 
trivial, neutral, or cited for some other reason, it casts doubt on whether they influenced the sister 
court.   
Finally, they tend to rely on Shepherd’s citations which is problematic because it relies 
upon the subjective judgment of Shepherd’s and the authors themselves admit finding instances 
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of cases they would have coded differently.  Additionally, there may be multiple issues involved 
and there is no way to tell if the citation is for a substantive or procedural matter.  
In this study I seek to improve our understanding of policy diffusion in the courts. Like 
others, I am interested in showing whether and how some courts are more influential than 
others.  In the following sections I describe the way I accomplish this, namely by separating 
prestige and influence, relying on a close reading of relevant cases rather than the accuracy of the 
Shepherd’s citations, and refining citation analysis so as to more accurately determine whether a 
court’s  opinion can be said to influence the decision of a sister court. 
Hypothesis 
 I begin by hypothesizing that prestige leads to influence.  That is, if a court is 
prestigious, it is more likely to influence the decisions of sister courts. In order to avoid equating 
prestige with influence, each is defined by different criteria. Prestige is defined as an evaluation 
from the legal community that a court ranks high in reputation or esteem. Influence is defined as 
a demonstrated effect on the decisions of other state supreme courts. Specifically, a state 
Supreme Court influences the decision of a sister court when its decisions are both cited and 
followed (and not part of a long string citation).  
Operationalization of Prestige 
As noted above, Social science definitions tend to associate prestige with influence for 
individuals or collectivities that are in "structured" or "hierarchical" or "ranking" relationships or 
systems:  
Specifically, we suggest that prestige should be understood as a particular form of social 
power and advantage that is of a symbolic rather than of an economic or political 
character, and which gives rise to structured relationships of deference, acceptance and 
derogation. (Goldthorpe and Hope, 1972,  p. 20);  
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Prestige is an entitlement to deference (Shils [1968] 1994), and as such it has an 
inherently hierarchical quality… The entitlement to deference arises out of respect and 
admiration that are deserved in the sense that they are grounded in the values of the group 
in which the person is esteemed or the role is considered prestigious. (Sandefur, 2004,  p. 
383); 
  
 Prestige is a particularly potent basis for the form of power that resides in influence, or 
the ability to get others to do what one wants because others already want to comply with 
one's wishes, even before those wishes are expressed. (Parsons, 1963) (Sandefur, 2004, p. 
384); 
 
Basically, prestige is the granting of higher human evaluation an individual or a 
collectivity or a symbol, within the ranking system of other individuals, collectivities, or 
symbols… Above all, it is evident that prestige plays a considerable role in the 
domination-submission process. The degree of conformity is greater the higher the 
prestige of the person or the group seeking to influence others. "(Roueck, 1957) 
 
 
In the context of state supreme courts, a court can be termed as prestigious when it is held in high 
regard in the legal community.  To determine whether a court is held in high regard in the legal 
community, I rely on evaluations from law reviews. 
 Using Hein Online, JSTOR and Google Scholar I searched the three courts for references 
to prestige, leadership or  reputation That is I would input the name of the court and then search 
the terms “reputation”, “prestige” and “leadership”  Many of the articles associated or equated 
those terms with activism or innovation, but I did not use those search terms. I did not put any 
kind of date limit on the search.  I found 19 relevant items. Table 2 provides a short synopsis of 
articles with positive evaluations. Table 3 shows negative evaluations. 
 Prestige is defined as an evaluation from the legal community that a court ranks high in 
reputation or esteem. This is operationalized by means of an extensive review of law review 
articles addressing the issue of state Supreme Court prestige.   
 The articles associate prestige with a state court using its own constitution to create new 
law or new rights for criminal suspects over and above the federal minimum floor.  If an article 
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uses a term such as “liberal" or "activist", it generally refers to an innovation under the state 
constitution. Conversely, the articles associate a loss of prestige when a court ceases to provide 
judicial innovation or overrules prior decisions in that area. I am narrowing my focus to the 
limited area of providing greater protections under the state constitution, or the New Judicial 
Federalism.   
 I did not find any articles that contradicted that general pattern.  Prestige (and influence) 
were associated with judicial innovation in general and granting greater rights for the criminally 
accused under the state constitution in particular. Loss of prestige was synonymous with failing 
to continue innovation, or cutting back on prior innovations.   
As stated, there is also empirical confirmation of prestige. As noted in Table 4, Mott and 
Caldiera concluded that the California, Michigan and New Jersey Supreme Courts were in the 
top ten in the nation based upon citations from sister courts for the years studied. Dear  and 
Jessen  ranked the California Supreme Court number one in the nation based upon followed 
cases as determined by Shepherd’s citations. Up to a certain date, these courts are consistently 
treated as prestigious empirically.     
In summary, prestige is operationalized normatively as being held in high regard by the 
legal community. Empirically, it is operationalized by a raw citation count.  High citation counts 
from sister courts equate to high prestige.   
Operationalization of Influence 
Influence is defined as deference, derogation, the ability to get others to do what one 
wants, or the ability to effect the actions of others.   It can be discerned but not directly 
measured. However, we can set some minimum requirements as to what must be observed for 
influence to occur. 
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In this study I operationalize influence as having occurred when a state Supreme Court 
opinion is both cited and followed by sister courts.  It does not occur if the citation is part of a 
long string citation, cited with other courts or authorities, or not germane to the New Judicial 
Federalism.   
This is a more demanding criterion than what others have used.  Mott and Caldeira, for 
instance use raw citation counts, where a citation in a string of other citations is treated as 
equivalent to a citation that stands alone in the text of the decision.  There is also no attempt to 
determine if it was followed, or indeed how it was employed at all.  
To address this problem, I distinguish between various types of citations.  A case is not 
counted as influencing a court unless it is followed and not part of a long string citation or cited 
with other courts or authorities.  That is, when a court cites decisions from other state supreme 
courts and then follows that decision, one may be able to infer that the original decision 
influenced the subsequent decision.  However, when a citation is not followed or is merely part 
of a long string citation, there is no ground for inferring influence. As noted earlier, a simple 
citation to a case may be for a myriad of reasons, but influence may be inferred only if the case is 
actually followed.   
Again, I chose these three states because they have consistently been ranked as influential 
by the empirical and normative literature.  At later dates, some of them lost influence according 
to normative evaluations.  I chose 1975 because that was the year empirically analyzed by 
Caldiera, and finding those courts in the top 10 nationally. Additionally, all had prestige 
according to the academic literature.  I chose 1998 because that was the year in which the 
Michigan Supreme Court began losing prestige in the legal community and was 12 years after 
the removal of Rose Bird in California  
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Data and Procedure for Analysis 
Data 
I obtained my data through Lexis Academic Universe. I took the volume numbers of the 
applicable state reporters for the year examined, and did a search to determine how many times 
each was cited by the highest courts of all the states.  For example, for the year 1975, volumes 
66, 67 and 68 were the applicable reporter numbers for the Supreme Court of New Jersey.  Thus, 
“66 NJ” “67 NJ” “68 NJ” were my search terms narrowed to the highest courts of all states. 
Similarly, the reporter numbers for the State of California were 13 Cal 3d., 14 Cal 3d. and 15Cal 
3d.   Once I had a raw number, I then broke down further based upon the legal issue(s) involved 
and how the citation was treated by the sister courts. 
  In order to winnow this down to a manageable project, I chose to focus upon particular 
years when the respective courts had either positive or negative evaluations by the legal 
community.(1975 and 1978)  Even narrowed to those parameters, data collection was extremely 
time consuming and tedious.  Because of the time involved in gathering the data, there is no 
comparison to other state courts regarding citation history.  This is a weakness in the 
methodology, but a necessary one.   
Procedure for Analysis 
Then, using an Excel Spreadsheet, I calculated percentages for each of the categories.  
Starting with the total number of cited cases, I determined how many were actually followed, or 
part of a string cite, or how they otherwise fell into the categories enumerated below.  I then, as 
noted above, did the same calculations based upon the subject matter of the case.  I next 
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examined cases followed or not followed, then broke down further based upon the New Judicial 
Federalism.   
My denominators were the total number of cases cited or total amount for a criminal law 
and procedure. My numerators varied depending upon the various categories.  For example, if 
there were 500 cases cited in total, and 20 were followed, then my percentage was 4%.(20/500).    
I did this for the total number of cases cited and then further broke down the results for criminal 
law and procedure.  As an exemplar, if 150 of the cases involved criminal law or procedure then 
my percentage was 30% (150/500).  I then further broke those numbers down by category for 
totals and total amount of criminal law and procedure cases cited.  If 10 were followed, I had two 
percentages-10/500 or 2% for criminal law and procedure in relation to the total cases cited, and 
10/150 or roughly 7%.   
Finally, instead of looking at how many times a court is cited in a year, I examine the 
frequency a court from a given year is cited in the ensuing years. For example, Calderia 
examines how many times sister courts cited other courts in the year 1975. I look at the year 
1975 for California, New Jersey, and Michigan and see how many times those courts are cited 
from 1975 to the present, breaking down into the subcategories noted above. I am particularly 
looking to see if a substantial portion are actually followed by a sister court. 
I again note that this method was tedious and time-consuming, but I found many 
situations where a court followed a decision or an aspect of a decision, but that was not reflected 
in the Sheppard’s citations.  In other words, I found many situations where I believed a case or 
issue was followed, but it did not show as followed according to Sheppard’s.  Obviously, much 
of this is subjective, but it shows the danger (in my opinion) of simply mechanically applying 
numbers as opposed to actually reading and analyzing the case 
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It is necessary to define the terms and symbols as I use them in this study. “F” means 
followed by the citing court, and “NF” means not followed.  “SC” stands for string-citation.  A 
string citation is, as the name implies, a long list of citations strung together and often involving 
multiple jurisdictions.  If a case is cited with other jurisdictions or authorities, but is not a string 
cite per-se, it is labeled “FCOCA” meaning cited with other cases or authorities.   
There is sometimes overlap between the two categories.   “CP” means that the case was 
cited by one of the parties or a lower court, and the higher court addressed it.  “D” and “C” are 
for dissent and concurrence respectively.  If a case is cited as part of dicta or for purposes not 
related to the main issues of the case, it is “COP” or cited for other purpose ( See Table 1)  
After examining the years 1975 and 1998, I then examined the subsequent citation history 
of specific cases expanding or contracting the rights of the accused under state constitutions.   
Before presenting results, it is necessary to provide some historical background for each of the 
courts.  
As noted earlier, citation analysis involves the use of citations for reasons other than 
information retrieval and is a method used in the area of public law.  For example, Shapiro used 
citation analysis to rate the most prestigious and influential law review articles. Using Shepard’s 
citations, he compiled a list of those most frequently cited by other authorities and ranked them 
from highest to lowest.  Those with the most citations were the most prestigious and influential. 
(Shapiro 1985)  
  Three seminal articles regarding state supreme courts are: The Business of State 
Supreme Courts 1870-1970 (Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman and Wheeler, 1977) (Kagan, et al., 
1977), and The Evolution of State Supreme Courts (Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman and Wheeler, 
1977) (Kagan and Carwright et.al) and State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation 
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(Friedman, Kagan, Cartwright and Wheeler (1981). (Friedman, et al., 1981)   All three articles 
employ citation analysis to reach their various conclusions. 
 In The Business of State Supreme Courts 1870-1970, the authors examined a sample of 
opinions issued by 16 State Supreme Courts at five-year intervals between 1970-1970.  (The 
courts examined were Alabama, California, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, and West Virginia).  The authors were attempting to ascertain whether caseloads had 
changed, or if there was a decline or increase in particular areas of law, and the effect of judicial 
structure, judicial culture, socioeconomic change and changes in substantive law upon both. 
(Kagan, et al., 1977) 
 As might be expected, they found that as state populations increased (California and 
Michigan specifically) so did the caseload of the respective courts, and this was accompanied by 
much shorter opinions as the courts attempted to deal with the larger volume of cases (Kagan, et 
al., 1977) Other factors affecting the business of state supreme courts were the discretion to 
select or reject particular types of cases, and the introduction of an intermediate appellate court.  
(Kagan, et al., 1977).  They then determined that there was a noticeable decrease in Supreme 
Court workloads over the time period studied and a “…shift…toward noncommercial cases-from 
a concentration on debt collection and property cases to an emphasis on tort, criminal, public 
law, and family law matters” (Kagan, et al., 1977,  p. 156 Emphasis in original).  
 In The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, the authors examine the same 16 courts to 
determine how the volume of cases affected the structure and institutional characteristics of those 
courts from, again, 1870-1970.  They then created a typology of those courts based upon the 
factors of caseload and discretion: 
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Type I: Low population states (under one million) with no supreme court case-selecting 
discretion, no lower appellate court and relatively light caseloads… Type II: Medium 
sized (over one million) and large states with little or no supreme court case-selecting 
discretion and heavy caseloads… (and) Type III: Medium-sized or large states with 
substantial controls over supreme court caseloads (Kagan and Cartwright, et al., 1974, p. 
984) 
 
They then conclude generally that all the state courts studied have evolved into: “…smaller 
numbers of opinions and greater case-selection discretion” which may encourage activism 
because the courts are free to concentrate upon “‘key’” cases (Kagan and Cartwright, et al., 
1974, p. 1001). 
The final article: State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation again analyzes 
the same 16 courts, but the focus this time is on the quality and length of the opinions 
themselves.  They were looking for characteristics such as opinion length, dissent rates, and 
citation practice (including secondary authorities and law review articles).  They conclude 
broadly that opinions are gradually growing in length, dissents are increasing, and courts are 
more likely to cite cases than secondary authorities, and that any citations to secondary 
authorities are more likely to involve changing existing law as opposed to those that 
“…crystallize the teachings of the past” (Friedman, et al., 1981, p. 817). 
In 2000, the authors’ findings were updated in: The Business of State Supreme Courts 
Revisited (Kritzer, 2000).  Using date obtained by Paul Brace and Melinda Gann, Kritzer 
examined whether the trends noted in the prior article had continued, slowed down, or perhaps 
ceased altogether. He determined that some patterns continued such as a decrease in debt and 
real property cases and an increase in criminal (Kritzer, 2000)  He further concluded that, torts 
and family law failed to increase, and there was an explosion of cases in the category of “other 
contract” (Kritzer, 2000)   
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After examining the years 1975 and 1998, I then examined the subsequent citation history 
of specific cases expanding or contracting the rights of the accused under state constitutions.   
Before presenting results, it is necessary to provide some historical background for each of the 
courts.  
California Supreme Cour t 
In 1848, pursuant to the first California Constitution, Supreme Court justices were 
selected through partisan elections to serve six-year terms. (Culver & Wold, 1986)   This was 
modified somewhat by the 1879 Constitution which provided for twelve year terms. (Culver & 
Wold 1988).  The current system, adopted in 1934, provides for nomination by the Governor and 
approval by a Commission on Judicial Appointments consisting of the Attorney General, the 
chief justice, and presiding judge of the court of appeals. (Thompson, 1988).  It is a twelve year 
appointment, and the judge is subject to a retention election at the end of the Governor’s term. 
(Thompson, 1988) 
1940 is generally considered to be a turning point for the court.  That was the year that 
Governor Culbert Olson appointed Chief Justice Philip Gibson and Associate Justice Roger 
Traynor. (Mulcahy, 2000)  “More a superb judicial administrator than a legal scholar, (Chief 
Justice) Gibson, over the years, transformed the California court system from one of 
disorganized locally controlled courts with overlapping jurisdiction into a model of state court 
systems” (Thompson, 1988, p. 2011).  One of his innovations was the use of qualified attorneys 
to assist the judges as opposed to law clerks. (Thompson, 1988)  This particular change would 
cause major public relations problems for future courts.  (Thompson, 1988). 
Roger Traynor became the new chief justice in 1964 upon the retirement of Gibson. 
(Thompson, 1988)  “Traynor is recognized as one of the truly great common law judges, 
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justifiably ranked with such eminent jurists as Learned Hand” (Thompson, 1988, p. 2013).  The 
Traynor court was known for many liberal activist decisions and overturning precedent, but the 
Chief Justice insisted that any such rulings must be: “…restrained by intellectual discipline…” 
and  that the judge must reason through “…each step of the justification” (Thompson, 1988, p. 
2013).   
Governor Ronald Reagan appointed Donald R. Wright to replace Chief Justice Traynor 
upon his retirement in 1970 (Thompson, 2010).  Wright was popular, a more than adequate legal 
scholar, and “…an enthusiastic participant in the collegiality of the court” (Thompson, 1988 p. 
2014).  Shortly thereafter, the appointment of Justice Matthew Tobriner caused a shift away from 
Justice Traynor’s philosophy of judging, to a view that, “…the court should be an instrument of 
social change” (Thompson, 1988, p. 2015).  Justice Tobriner:  
“…deplored the failure of the legal system to respond to the oppression of racial 
minorities, women, and the poor… (and)…proposed that ‘demands for social reform-and 
even for social revolution-be pressed in the judicial sphere and framed in the context of 
legal relationships’” (Thompson, 1988, p. 2015).   
  
The subsequent appointment of Justice William P. Clark provided a countervailing voice 
on the court, but it never commanded a majority. (Thompson, 1988)  Justice Clark was a close 
confidant of Ronald Reagan, and he shared the same philosophy (Thompson, 1988).  Shortly 
after he joined the court “…he became the dissenting voice to a ‘liberal’ majority block led by 
Justice Tobriner” (Thompson, 1988, p. 2015).  Chief Justice Wright invariably voted with this 
majority block, and “…the court accelerated the activist course it had begun in the Traynor 
years” (Thompson, 1988, p. 2015)   
This activism continued until the appointment of Rose Bird as Chief Justice in 1977 and 
well beyond, but there was a major difference.  Unlike prior courts, the Bird Court was widely 
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criticized and condemned for many of its activist decisions (Mulcahy, 2000).  There were 
numerous explanations for why this occurred, and the first was the actual appointment itself.   
There was thus much hostility to the appointment in the legal community (Thompson, 
1988).   In fact, although she got the two out of three votes necessary for confirmation, Attorney 
General Evelle Younger: “...reluctantly voted to confirm, although he said that he would have 
appointed someone else were he governor” (Culver & Wold, 1986, p. 84).  Presiding Justice of 
the court of appeals, Parker Wood, voted against the confirmation: “…presumably on the 
grounds that he would oppose any nominee who did not have prior judicial experience” (Culver 
& Wold, 1986, p. 84).   
There was active opposition from some members of the general public as well.  Bird 
incurred the wrath of agricultural interests during her term as secretary of agriculture with her 
pro-labor stance. (Culver & Wold, 1986)  For example, Catholic Bishop Roger Mahoney, who 
had previously been chairman of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board, wrote a letter to the 
Commission to record his ‘vigorous ‘opposition’ to her appointment (Culver & Wold, 1986, p. 
84).   
All these factors became very important later when there was public opposition to many 
of the Bird Court’s activist decisions.  There had been opposition to decisions of the Taylor and 
Wright courts as well,  but: “The residue of the court’s reputation for scholarship and the esteem 
in which Chief Justice Wright was held by establishment lawyers and commentators-liberal, 
conservative, and centrist, served as a buffer against these attacks” (Thompson 1988 p 2022).  
However, when Chief Justice Bird took office: “The buffers against the attacks which claimed 
that the court was exceeding its accepted role, were pierced” (Thompson, 1988, p. 2022).   
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Chief Justice Bird faced her first retention election in 1978 and although she was 
retained, it was by a slim margin (Thompson, 1988). She had written a concurring opinion in a 
criminal case concluding that “rape per se” did not constitute great bodily injury (Culver & 
Wold, 1986, p. 85) and a dissenting opinion in a case challenging Proposition 13 asserting that: 
“…it was unconstitutionally discriminatory to require property owners to pay markedly varying 
taxes on properties of similar market value” (Culver & Wold, 1986, p. 85) which were used 
against her by the opposition (Culver & Wold, 1986).  While neither of these votes determined 
the outcome of the cases, they were characterized as “…evidence that her decision making ran 
counter to the public interest” (Culver & Wold, 1986, p. 85) 
As noted above, the Bird court continued the activist tradition of previous courts, but it 
was the area of criminal law and procedure that provoked the most controversy (Culver & Wold, 
1986).  The court: “…steadily extended application of the exclusionary rule, imposed strict 
standards upon the admission of confessions, and broadened its test regarding insanity pleas in a 
manner favorable to those entering such pleas”  (Culver & Wold, 1986, p. 86).  Again, the Chief 
Justice distinguished herself by voting in favor of defendants 75% of the time as opposed to 70% 
for the other liberals on the court (Culver & Wold, 1986).   
There was negative public reaction to many of these decisions, but it was the issue of 
capital punishment which most galvanized court critics (Culver & Wold, 1988).  As of 1988, the 
California Supreme Court had overturned 95% of the death sentences that came before it as 
opposed to 43% among other state courts and 60% for federal courts. (Culver & Wold, 1986)  
More importantly, the Chief Justice voted to reverse death sentences 100% of the time. 
(Thompson, 1988)          
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The above combination of factors led to a highly organized and successful campaign to 
oust Bird and fellow liberals Cruz Reynoso and Joseph Grodin. (Wold & Culver, 1987).    To put 
it more bluntly: “Court critics hope that Bird’s defeat and the rejection of two other justices will 
signal an end to what they call the ‘public be damned’ attitude and ultra-liberal trends of the Bird 
Court” (Culver & Wold, 1986, p. 81).  Counterarguments from Bird Court supporters that the 
retention election was really an assault on judicial independence failed to carry the day (Wold & 
Culver, 1986). 
The retention election had major ramifications for future court rulings.  Three liberal-
activist justices were replaced with justices of a more moderate viewpoint.  “The contrast 
between the legacy of judicial activism and the work of the current California Supreme Court 
under Bird’s successor, Malcolm M. Lucas is palpable” (Blum, 1991, p. 49).   Similarly:  
Reading a death penalty opinion of the Bird Court then a death penalty opinion of the 
Lucas Court, one often sees the same precedents cited and the same legal principles 
exalted… (however)…The approach of the Bird court in reviewing death penalty 
judgments reflected a norm of reversal, in which the court paid little heed to principles 
such as abstention, the substantial evidence rule, and the principles of harmless error.  
Doubts, particularly those involving choice of sentence, were resolved in favor of 
reversal because of the severity and finality of the judgment being reviewed (Uelman, 
1989, p. 238-239) 
 
It was at this point that academic opinion began to turn against the court 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Although not officially recognized as a state until 1837, Michigan ratified its first 
constitution in 1835, which provided for a supreme court composed of justices appointed by the 
governor with the advice and consent of the state senate serving seven-year terms (Wise, 1986).  
The legislature was tasked with determining the composition and jurisdiction of the court, and 
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the initial legislation provided for three judges serving the three judicial circuits of the state 
(Wise, 1986)   
    As the years went on, the court grew and expanded, but was relatively undistinguished 
until the tenure of the “Big Four” (Chief Justice Thomas Cooley and Associate Justices Isaac P. 
Christiancy, James V Campbell, and Benjamin F. Graves) from 1868 to 1875 (Schneider, 2008). 
During that era, it: “… was generally rated as one of the finest appellate courts in the country-for 
a while perhaps ‘the ablest State court that ever existed’” (Wise, 1987, p.1509 citing Browne, 
1898).   
Examples of praise include: “The Michigan Reports are among the best in the country at 
the present time. The reporter is better than average, and the judges are candid, able, and well 
informed” (Book Notice, 3 Am. Law Rev. 141 (1868); “We have spoken of the excellence of the 
Michigan Reports in former numbers of this review. It will do no harm, however, to repeat that 
this court sets an example of judicial gravity and decorum which one could wish were more 
widely followed” (Book Notice 3 Am law Rev. 757 (1869); and “The Michigan Reports rank, we 
think, first among those that reach us from the western states.  The decisions are vigorous and 
searching, and the reporting is fair” (Book Notice 6 Am Law Rev. 558 (1872).    
   The court of the Big Four: “…helped shape our nation’s understanding of separation of 
powers and standing to sue” (Schneider, 2008, p. 3).   It should be noted that the court was not 
considered “activist” or “progressive” during this period: “The justices frequently articulated 
their intention to follow the Michigan Constitution…even in hotly controversial areas such as 
public funding for railroads” (Schneider, 2008, p. 3).  Despite same: “…the court of the Big Four 
was quite well regarded, and that reputation has continued until the present day” (Schneider, 
2008, p. 3).        
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It was apparently undistinguished from that point until the 1970’s when it gained a 
reputation for activism (Schneider, 2008). “…California, New Jersey, and Michigan have been 
the subject of extensive analysis.  They are also regarded as the most activist and innovative state 
supreme courts in the nation” (Hagan, 1988, p. 97).  “The Michigan Supreme Court enjoyed a 
reputation for activism and innovation in recent decades.  "The Court took an active role in the 
development of civil liberties issues and tort law innovations” (Parker, 1996, p. 345).  It was 
during this period that the court overturned precedents in the areas of criminal law, torts, and 
contracts, granting greater protections for suspects, broader liability for alleged tortfeasors, and 
allowing the court to determine whether a contractual clause was ‘”reasonable’” (Schneider, 
2008, p.4).  
The main reason for this shift was the 1970 nomination and election of former governors 
G. Mennen “Soapy” Williams and John B Swanson to the court. As noted by Schneider: “Prior 
to their elections, William’s and Swainson’s experience in state government consisted of making 
public policy rather than interpreting it” (Schneider, 2008, p. 4 emphasis in original).   
Additionally, both had appointed several members of the court who shared their judicial 
philosophy. (Schneider, 2008) With this dynamic in place, the court: “… began overruling and 
disregarding long-standing court decisions in politically sensitive or policy-oriented areas of the 
law…and overruling  long established precedent including opinions of the “Big Four” 
(Schneider, 2008, p. 4)   
This all changed with the election of John Engler as governor in 1990. (Schneider, 2008)  
Engler had a much different judicial philosophy from that of Swainson and Williams and 
elucidated it thus: 
 I want jurists on the Michigan bench who understand that it is legislators, not judges, 
who make the law; who believe that the people should govern through their elected 
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representatives; who comprehend that the burden of policy making is on the legislative 
not the judicial branch; who render decisions based on the text of the Constitution or 
statute rather than on somebody’s social agenda. In short: I’m looking for a few 
intelligent, hard working men and women with fidelity to the Constitution! (Engler, 
2002) 
 
From 1997 to 1999, Governor Engler appointed four strict constructionists- Clifford Taylor, 
Robert Young Jr., Maura Corrigan and Stephen J Markman to the court, who were returned to 
office in the succeeding general elections (Schneider, 2008).   
It was after 1998 that the court began overturning some of the above mentioned 
precedents, and was subjected to harsh criticism.   
New Jersey Supreme Cour t 
The New Jersey court system was originally modeled upon medieval English tribunals 
(Tarr & Porter, 1988).  The courts established by the 1776 New Jersey Constitution retained 
many of the institutional and structural characteristics of those tribunals, including separate 
courts for law and equity (Tarr & Porter, 1988).   The constitution adopted in 1844 added 
additional courts to the system to cope with such issues as a burgeoning population and interstate 
migration, but the basic structure and features of the court system remained intact (Tarr & Porter, 
1988).         
This process of adding new courts was apparently ad hoc at best, and “…as of 1947 
seventeen separate classes of courts were operating in the state, frustrating all attempts to impose 
system and uniformity and creating a jurisdictional maze for unwary litigants” (Tarr & Porter, 
1988, p. 187).  Although New Jersey was not alone in adding courts in a haphazard fashion, 
“…the shortcomings of ‘Jersey Justice’ were so severe that the American Judicature Society, the 
nation’s preeminent organization supporting judicial reform, felt compelled to nominate New 
Jersey’s as ‘the nation’s worst court system’ (Tarr & Porter, 1988, p. 188).  
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The 1947 Constitution made major changes to the court system that would forever 
change that perception. The perceived magnitude of the changes is best summed up by the 
Journal of the American Judicature Society (1948):  
Next September 15 the people of New Jersey will exchange America’s worst court 
system for America’s best…The hundred year order now on its way out had staunch 
supporters to the last, but there are few to deny that the accomplishments of the New 
Jersey bench and bar have been in spite of the court structure and not because of it.  "New 
Jersey Goes to the Head of the Class"  
 
Among the changes were a restructuring of the court system by “…unifying the courts of 
law and equity; granting the supreme court control over administration, practice, and procedure 
in all courts; and limiting the functions of each judge to one court” (Mulcahy, 2000, p. 900).  In 
addition, it mandated that the Chief Justice would be the administrative head of the entire court 
system. (Wefing, 1997) Among other things, it allows the Chief Justice to assign and re-assign: 
 
 … all superior court justices as he or she sees fit…In other jurisdictions, the appellate 
judges are either appointed or elected and cannot be changed or removed from that 
position by the chief justice.  In New Jersey, if appellate division judges were constantly 
challenging the authority of the court they simply could be returned to their positions on 
the trial court and in whatever trial court the chief so designated (Wefing, 1997, p. 725) 
 
This makes the position of chief justice a powerful one, which was what the drafters of the 
constitution intended (Mulcahy, 1997). 
 Arthur Vanderbilt was the first chief justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court. (Wefing, 
1997).  He had previously been Dean of New York Law School, president of the American Bar 
Association, and “...was instrumental in developing the Judicial Article of the 1947 Constitution” 
(Wefing, 1997, p. 725).  He was considered for the position of Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court by President Eisenhower which ultimately went to Earl Warren (Wefing, 1997).  
He was subsequently considered for a position of associate justice but poor health caused him to 
request that he be removed from consideration (Wefing, 1997).  He was obviously very capable 
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and well-respected in the legal community (Mulcahy, 2000). “Through his support of judicial 
reform and his service as Chief Justice, Arthur Vanderbilt fundamentally reshaped-one might 
even say created-the New Jersey Supreme Court” (Tarr & Porter, 1998, p. 186).   
 Appropriately, it was Vanderbilt who started the New Jersey Supreme Court on its 
activist path (Wefing, 1997).  One of the court’s first, and most controversial decisions, was 
Winberry v Salisbury (1947) which involved judicial v legislative power.  The 1947 Constitution 
stated that the Supreme Court had rule making power ‘subject to law’ (Tarr & Porter, 1988, p. 
192).  The legislature maintained that ‘subject to law’ meant it had statutory power to oversee 
and regulate the court’s rule-making power.  Vanderbilt saw it differently and held that:  
The only interpretation of ‘subject to law’ that will not defeat the objective of the people 
to establish an integrated judicial system and which will at the same time give rational 
significance to the phrase is to construe it as the equivalent of  substantive law as 
distinguished from pleading and practice… (Tarr & Porter, 1998, p. 192 quoting 
Winberry) 
 
In other words, as long as the court was not creating substantive law, but devoted its power to 
procedural matters only, it was not subject to legislative oversight (Tarr & Porter, 1988). 
 The opinion was criticized by members of the court itself: “Justice Case observed that it 
was not necessary to construe the constitutional provision in order to resolve the case” (Tarr & 
Porter, 1988, p.192).  Further, the ruling was contrary to the constitutional history of the 
provision   (Tarr & Porter, 1988).  During the drafting process, the Committee on the Judiciary 
had specifically stated that it considered “subject to law” the same as subject to legislation, as 
had Vanderbilt himself (Tarr & Porter, 1988). “Thus, although Vanderbilt’s may have secured 
the independence of the judiciary…it more closely resembled a usurpation than a faithful 
interpretation of the constitution” (Tarr & Porter, 1988, p. 193).   
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 Winberry had larger significance beyond its holding:  “… it showed the court reaching 
out to address a politically explosive issue rather than deciding a case on narrow grounds” (Tarr 
and Porter, 1988, p. 193).  It also showed that the court would not shy away from controversial 
issues (Tarr & Porter, 1988). Most importantly, it set the tone for future courts: “…in both 
opinions and extrajudicial writings, he (Vanderbilt) categorically rejected the standard canons of 
judicial restraint.  And his influence has been decisive: what Vanderbilt preached and practiced 
became orthodoxy for the New Jersey Supreme Court” (Tarr & Porter, 1988, p. 193).   
 This view of the judicial role, coupled with the addition of several liberal justices 
in subsequent years  led to many decisions in the area of the New Judicial Federalism applauded 
by the legal community (Tarr & Porter, 1988). 
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Chapter  5 
Findings 
1975 
I began my analysis with the year 1975, which is the year that Caldeira empirically 
examined and analyzed and when all three courts were prestigious according to evaluations by 
the legal community.  It additionally falls squarely within the era of the New Judicial Federalism. 
He ranked the California, Michigan and New Jersey courts number one, ten and three 
respectively. For ease of presentation, I will note the results for cases followed and not followed 
and combine the remaining categories as “other”  A complete breakdown for all the categories is 
attached as Appendix A.   
 The distribution of citations is presented in Table 5.  California’s decisions were followed 
in 15% of the subsequent cases while Michigan was followed in 25% and New Jersey in 22%  
      As can be seen, raw numbers do not tell the whole story. All three courts are actually cited 
and followed less than 30% of the time.  Remember, these courts are in the top ten according to 
Calderia in terms of high citation counts. Additionally, a significant portion of the citations are 
either part of a string cite, cited with other cases or authorities, or cited by one of the parties.  If 
the prestige translates into influence, I would expect larger percentages cited and followed. 
Again, there is no comparison with other courts, but in terms of sheer numbers, I would expect 
larger percentages.   
Table 6 summarizes the results for criminal and constitutional law as a percentage of the 
total cases cited. California, Michigan and New Jersey were subsequently followed 8%, 12% and 
5% of the time respectively.  
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 The raw numbers are relatively high for California and Michigan at 42% and 46% 
respectively, with New Jersey at a noticeably lower 28%.  However the frequency with which 
court decisions were followed by sister courts is substantially smaller. Additionally, there are 
also a substantial percentage that are part of a string cite, cited with other authorities and courts, 
or not followed at all. 
Table 7 shows the distribution of citations among the total amount of criminal and 
constitutional laws cited.   For California the total amount followed was (19%), Michigan 24% 
and New Jersey 16%.  
 The percentage of cases followed is higher, but among those decisions I found very little 
evidence of the new judicial federalism being cited and followed by other state courts. There 
were many cases involving issues such as the proper conditions for probation, prosecutorial duty 
to the grand jury, the appropriate standard for civil commitment, or affixing responsibility for 
jury instructions, but few that expanded the rights of the accused under a state constitution. There 
were, however, a few notable exceptions for each court which will be discussed below when 
examining those courts in more detail.     
For example,  the New Jersey Supreme Court was frequently cited for holdings such as 
the fact that waivers of appeal are permissible as part of a plea-bargain agreement, or that a 
prosecutor may not insulate himself from review by bargaining away appeal rights, but again, it 
was always in conjunction with numerous other courts.  In other words, I could find little, if any 
evidence of the New Jersey Supreme Court issuing rulings involving the new judicial federalism 
which were ultimately followed by multiple sister courts.  Additionally, as mentioned above, 
New Jersey’s overall percentage of cases involving criminal or constitutional issues was 
appreciably lower than Michigan or California 
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Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court featured cases involving “lesser included 
offense” jury instructions and the application of the so-called “castle doctrine” involving when a 
homeowner must retreat in the face of attack, but nothing expanding the rights of criminal 
suspects. Also, as with New Jersey, most of the cases were cited along with numerous other 
courts.  
1998 
I next analyzed the year 1998 because that was the year when the Michigan Supreme 
Court began to be excoriated in many quarters (Delaney, 2002; Serra, 2004; Miller, 2006). It is 
also twelve years after the ouster of Justice Rose Bird in California. As shown in Table 8, 
California was subsequently followed 23% of the time with Michigan at almost 40% and New 
Jersey 28%. 
 Table 9 shows the distribution of citations for cases involving criminal or constitutional 
law as a percentage of the total cases cited.  For the three courts the total amount followed was 
California 4%, Michigan 22% and New Jersey 2%.  Table 10 shows the distribution of citations 
among the total amount of criminal and constitutional laws cited.    
 For California, criminal law and constitutional procedure comprised 22% of the total, but 
only a few were actually followed and none involved the New Judicial Federalism.  People v. 
Jones (1998) was cited for  tangential issues such as the fact that counsel for the defense is 
entitled to a list of jurors, Georgia (F)1 People v. Hill (1998), and   Kansas (F)2
                                                          
1 Dorsey v The State (2005) 
 held, among 
multiple other issues, that a prosecutor has wide latitude in closing argument, but may not 
2 State v Kleypas (2001) 
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mischaracterize evidence, (it was a “see also”) and additionally Wyoming (F)3
Finally, 
 ruled that 
shackling a defendant in front of a jury is particularly problematic.  
People v. Massie (1998) Kansas (F)4
People v. Massie (1998)
, distinguished between trial and structural 
errors and concluded that trial errors were invariably harmless.  The only case with constitutional 
dimensions, also , concluded that double jeopardy does not attach when 
a guilty plea is invalidated. Iowa (F)5
Criminal procedure and constitutional law made up 33% of the total citations for the 
Supreme Court of Michigan. Numerous cases were cited and followed, but none involved the 
New Judicial Federalism.  
  The court referred to other sources but specifically cited 
and quoted the California opinion.    
People v. Lemmon (1998) Texas (F)6
People v. Gearns (1998)
 ruled that an appellate court 
does not have the discretion to rule upon the credibility of evidence,    
Delaware (FCOCA)7
People v. Goecke (1998)
  held that the confrontation clause does not apply to witnesses who do not 
testify or provide evidence,   West Virginia (F)8 involved proper jury 
instructions for malice. Finally, People v Starr (1998) West Virginia (F)9
For New Jersey, the total amount of citations in the area of criminal procedure and 
constitutional law was 12% with 2% followed. The first, 
 concluded that a 
victim’s testimony as to the fear of her attacker was not hearsay.    
State v. Bunyan (1998)  California (F 
(2))10 State v.  laid down the criteria for accepting exculpatory hearsay evidence, and the second, 
                                                          
3 Asch v State (2003) 
4 Kansas v Hill (2001) 
5 State v Cortez (2000)  
6 Johnson v Texas (2000) 
7 Shelton v Delaware (1999) 
8 State V Davis (2007)  
9 State v Mills (2005) 
10 People v Ayala   
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Morton, (1998) Rhode Island (F)11
There was one other case cited and not followed.  The Iowa court declined to adopt a 
limited definition of victim as had New Jersey in 
 concluded that a defendant has no constitutional right to be 
present at hearings involving issues of law.  
State v. Hill (1998). Iowa (NF)12
  To summarize, for the year 1975, which was the year all three courts had great 
reputations according to a raw citation count, each was cited and followed less than 30% of the 
time and few cases involved the New Judicial Federalism. By contrast, for the year 1998, which 
was when the Michigan Supreme Court ostensibly lost prestige, it was cited and followed almost 
40% of the time and 33% involved criminal procedure and constitutional law. Similarly, The 
California Supreme Court was actually cited and followed more frequently in 1998 than in 1975.  
In this situation, a comparison with other courts is not necessary.  I would not expect larger 
percentages followed for Michigan and California in 1998 when they lost prestige in the legal 
community than 1975. 
  Instead, the 
court chose to give the term a much more expansive definition.   
Subsequent Citation History-Criminal or Constitutional Law 
In this section, I examine decisions from the various courts expanding or contracting the 
rights of the accused under the state constitutions.   
New Jersey 
  State v Johnson (1975) held that a consent to search is invalid unless the suspect is 
specifically informed of his right to refuse to consent.  This provided greater protection than the 
                                                          
11 People v Brouillard (2000) 
12 State v Tesch (2005) 
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United States Supreme Court case of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, (1973) which held that there is 
no such requirement under the Fourth Amendment.  The court further held:  
…that under Art I par. 7 of our State Constitution the validity of a consent to search, even 
in a non-custodial situation, must be measured in terms of waiver, i.e., where the state 
seeks to justify a search on the basis of consent, it has the burden of showing that the 
consent was voluntary, an essential element of which is knowledge of the right to consent 
(Brennan, 1977, p. 500 quoting State v Johnson 68 N.J. 349, 353-354 (1975)) 
 
The high courts of Alaska (CPNF)13, Maryland (NFCOCA)14, New Hampshire 
(NFCOCA)15 (CPNF)16, and Pennsylvania (NFCOCA)17  declined to follow that precedent.  In 
fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that it could only find three states which take such a 
position.  The only court I could find which followed the ruling was the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas (FCOCA)18, and it did so over a stinging dissent. Colorado (SCF)19 followed the 
broader proposition that there need not be an express statement that suspect is free to refuse to 
allow the search It should be noted that the Johnson case is also frequently cited for the more 
generic proposition that states may provide greater protections under their own constitutions than 
the United States Constitution, but it is generally part of a large string cite involving numerous 
other courts. Massachusetts (SCF)20, Oklahoma (SCF)21 South Dakota (SCF)22
 Another example is State v Hunt (1982) which determined that there is a privacy interest 
in phone billing records, and thus police must obtain a warrant before obtaining them.  Colorado 
 
                                                          
13 Henry v State (1980) 
14 Scott v State (2001) 
15 State v Johnston (2004)  
16 State v. Osborne (1979) 
17 Commonwealth v. Cleckley  (1999) 
18 State v. Brown (2004)  
19 People v. Hayhurst (1977) 
20 Plymouth District v New England Telephone and Telegraph Company (1980) 
21 Messenger v Messenger (1992) 
22 State v Opperman (1976) 
64 
 
(F) (FCOCA) (D)23 followed and quoted this decision and emphasized that it was rejecting the 
contrary position of the Supreme Court and other states.  Texas (SCF) (C)24 similarly opted to 
adopt this approach.  However it cited the New Jersey case for the proposition that state courts 
may provide higher standards than federal.  Indeed, this case was one of many to observe that 
states may impose higher standards than federal, and numerous courts cited it for this proposition 
only.  Additionally, it was also frequently included in citations from other courts or other sources 
Delaware (FCOCA)25, Florida (FCOCA)26 Iowa (FCOCA)27. Kansas (SSNF)28
Two other exemplars are State v Hempele (1982) and State v Reed. (1993) In 
 declined to 
follow the ruling.   
Hempele, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that there is a right to privacy in garbage placed at the 
curb for pickup, and thus, police must obtain a warrant before searching it.  This analysis was 
followed by New Hampshire (F) (D(2))29, Vermont (F)30, Washington (F)31 and Alaska 
(FCOCA)32. It was not followed by Colorado (NFCOCA)(D)33, Connecticut (NF)3 
(NFCOCA)(D)234, Indiana (NFCOCA)35, Maryland (NF (2))36, North Dakota (CPNF)37
                                                          
23 People v. Sporleder (1983) 
, 
24 Davenport v. Garcia (1982) 
25 Dorsey v State (2000) 
26 Traylor v State (1992) 
27 State v Swain (1987) 
28 State v. Schultz (1993) 
29 State v. Goss (2003) 
30 State v. Morris (1996) 
31 State v. Boland (1990) 
32Beltz v State (2009)  
33 People v. Hillman (1992) 
34 State v. DeFusco  (1993) 
35 Litchfield v. State (2005)  
36 Moran v. State (1994) 
37 State v. Rydberg (1994) 
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Tennessee (NF)38, and Wyoming (NF)539
State v Reed (1993) held that if police are aware that there is an attorney present who 
wishes to speak to the suspect, they have a duty to communicate that. This holding provided 
greater protection for the accused than the Supreme Court ruling in Moran v Burbine (1986). 
This was followed by Michigan (F) (D)
.  In fact, Colorado and Connecticut cited it for the 
purpose of noting this was a minority position 
40  Oklahoma (SCF)41 Massachusetts (SCF)42 and Indiana 
(FCOCA)43.  However, the Indiana and Oklahoma courts did a further analysis and concluded 
that in the totality of the circumstances, defendant had waived his right to counsel. It was not 
followed by Arkansas (NF)44 and Tennessee (SCNF)45  It was cited by Illinois (COP)46 and New 
Hampshire (COP)47
The above results could best be described as paltry.  Here are glowing examples of a 
prestigious court exercising independent judgment that should be emulated across the country 
according the academics.  Instead, a few courts chose to follow these rulings while a greater 
number refused.  Additionally, some of the citations were for generic propositions that are found 
in numerous other cases. 
 as an example of a state imposing higher standards than the federal 
minimum.   
 
                                                          
38 State v. Ross (2001) 
39 Barekman v. State (2009) 
40 People v. Bender (1996) 
41 Dennis v. State (1999) 
42Commonwealth v. Mavredakis (2000)  
43 Malinski v. State (2003) 
44 Vance v. State (2011) 
45 State v. Stephenson (1994) 
46 Malinski v. State (2003) 
47 State v. Roache (2002) 
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California 
Here I examine pre-retention election California cases under the New Judicial Federalism 
or mentioned in the literature as examples of prestigious rulings. The first is People v. Superior 
Court (1975).   There, the court ruled that all police questioning must cease even if a request for 
an attorney is equivocal or ambiguous.  The court further concluded that there could be no valid 
subsequent waiver of Miranda rights after the initial equivocal request.   
Three courts, the District of Columbia (FCOCA)48 and North Carolina (FCOCA)49 chose 
to follow this precedent, while Georgia (NFCOCA)50, Kansas (NFCOCA)51, Illinois 
(NFCOCA)52(NFCOCA)(D)53(CPNF)54 and Pennsylvania (SCNF)55
Next is the case of 
 declined.  It should be 
noted that the case was usually included along with citations from other states, and it does not 
appear to be a pioneer ruling by California.   
People v. Shuey (1975).  Shuey involved the admission of evidence 
after an admitted illegal entry into the premises which was seized after the police obtained a 
valid search warrant.  The California court held that such evidence was per-se inadmissible: 
Analytically this case can be regarded simply as involving a de facto, inchoate seizure of 
the person and property of Paul the moment the police began the illegal occupation. 
Thereafter the obtaining of the warrant could no more operate to "disinfect this conduct" 
than if the police had actually seized the individual items sought to be suppressed prior to 
the acquisition of the warrant. (Shuey at 222)  
 
                                                          
48 Sanders v. United States (1989) 
49 State v. Torres (1992) 
50 Hall v. State (1985) 
51 State v. Newfield (1981) 
52 People v. Evans (1988) 
53 People v Smith (1984) 
54 People v. Krueger (1980) 
55 Commonwealth v. Hubble (1986) 
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  Oregon (F)56 and Washington (F)57 followed this ruling, while Arizona (NFCOCA)58 New 
York  (NFCOCA) (D)59  and Colorado (CPNF)60 declined. Ohio (COP)61
 
 cited it along with 
other sources regarding proper appellate procedure.  
People v. Brisendine (1975) held that an incarcerated person may not be subjected to a 
search beyond that required for weapons until the opportunity for bail has been provided or after 
it is posted. This ruling granted greater protection than the holding in United States v Robinson 
(1973).   It also held that the contents of an opaque container cannot, by definition, be in plain 
view.   Alaska (FCOCA)62 (FCOCA)63 (SCF) (COP (2)) (F) (FCOCA)64 (FCOCA)65 and New 
Mexico (F (7))66 were the only two states to follow that precedent.  Arizona (NFCOCA)67 cited 
the general holding and then elected to admit the evidence. Colorado (FCOCA)68
Brisendine also mentioned the generic proposition that states may apply higher criminal 
procedure standards than the United States Supreme Court.  Numerous states cited it for that 
proposition alone: Massachusetts (FCOCA)
 cited it for the 
limitations on a pat down search.  It was also cited numerous times in dissenting opinions and a 
concurrence.  
69(SCF)70(FCOCA)71(FCOCA)72
                                                          
56 State v. Hansen (1983) 
, New Hampshire 
57 State v. Bean (1978) 
58 State v. Martin (1984) 
59 People v. Arnau (1982)  
60 People v. Griffin (1986) 
61 Nolan v. Nolan (1984) 
62 Reeves v. State (1979) 
63 Middleton v State (1978) 
64 Zehrung v. State (1977) 
65 Anderson v. State (1976) 
66 People v Paul T. (1999) 
67 State v. Lamb (1977) 
68 People v. Casias (1977) 
69 Commonwealth v. Ortiz (1978) 
70 State v. Fuller (1985) 
71 O'Connor v. Johnson (1979) 
72 State v. Settle (1982) 
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(FCOCA)73, New Jersey (FCOCA)74(F)75, New Mexico (F)76(COP)77 North Dakota (FCOCA)78, 
Oregon (SSF(2))79, Rhode Island (FCOCA)80, South Dakota (SSF)81  and Washington 
(FCOCA)82
People v Disbrow (1976) was a ruling barring statements made without Miranda 
warnings from being used to impeach a suspect who testifies in his own behalf.  Aware the 
United States Supreme court had ruled otherwise, the court stated:  
 
We…declare that [the decision to the contrary of the United States Supreme Court] is not 
persuasive in any state prosecution in California…We pause…to reaffirm the 
independent nature of the California Constitution and our responsibility to separately 
define and protect the rights of California citizens despite conflicting decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court interpreting the federal Constitution (Disbrow 1976 p. 107). 
 
It should be noted that the Disbrow decision was subsequently abrogated by statute.   However, 
bearing in mind that caveat, no sister court cited Disbrow for any reason, either positive or 
negative.  
People v. Lines (1975) extended the attorney-client privilege to experts hired by the 
defense to prepare the case. Alaska (FCOCA)83 Colorado (SCF (2))84 (FCOCA)  
(C)85 and Maryland (FCOCA)86 chose to follow this interpretation, while Illinois (SCNF)87
                                                          
73 State v. Ball (1983) 
 
74 Right to Choose v. Byrne (1982) 
75 State v. Schmid (1980) 
76 State ex rel. Serna v. Hodges (1976) 
77 State v. Paul T. (1999) 
78 State v. Nordquist (1981) 
79 State v. Caraher (1982) 
80 State v. Benoit (1982) 
81 State v. Opperman (1976) 
82 Federated Publ'ns v. Kurtz (1980) 
83 Houston v. State (1979) 
84 Hutchinson v. People (1987) 
85 Miller v. District Court of Denver (1987) 
86 State v. Pratt (1979) 
87 People v. Knuckles (1994) 
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declined.  Again, neither this nor the holding that states may impose higher standards were 
unique to California and were cited along with many similar rulings by sister courts.  
People v Triggs (1973) held that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
public restrooms and overturned a conviction for oral copulation, based in large part on a police 
officer’s clandestine surveillance.  No sister state followed or cited it by itself.  However, there 
were some string citations from Montana (SCF)88, and North Carolina (SCF)89.  New York 
(SCF)90 adopted the criteria but found no reasonable expectation in the facts before it.  Three 
courts, Oklahoma (NFCOCA)91, Nevada, (NFCOCA)92 and Oregon (CPNF)93
Michigan 
 declined to adopt 
such a position.  
In this section, I examine Michigan Supreme Court cases expanding the rights of criminal 
suspects which were subsequently overruled.  Two examples are People v White (1973), and 
People v Cooper (1976).   
White involved a defendant who kidnapped, raped, and assaulted a woman.  He was 
convicted of rape in one county, and of kidnapping and felonious assault in a different county. 
The court held, contrary to People v Parrow (1890) that multiple prosecutions, even for crimes 
with different elements, violated the Double Jeopardy clause if the crimes were part of the same 
transaction or occurrence, and threw out the rape and felonious assault convictions (Schneider 
2008).    
                                                          
88 State v. Smith (2004) 
89 State v. Tarantino (1988) 
90 People v. Mercado (1986) 
91 Swann v State (1981) 
92 Young v. State (1993) 
93 State v. Holt (1981) 
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 In Cooper, the defendant was accused of bank robbery, attempted murder, and assault 
with intent to rob being armed.  He was acquitted of the bank robbery charge in federal court, but 
was convicted of all three charges in state court.  The court of appeals dismissed the attempted 
murder charge, and the Supreme Court set aside the other convictions. In a display of the New 
Judicial Federalism, the court ruled that the Michigan Constitution prohibits a second 
prosecution arising out of the same criminal act unless it appears from the record that the 
interests of the State of Michigan and the jurisdiction which initially prosecuted are substantially 
different. This provided greater protection than the United States Supreme Court case of Bartkas 
v Illinois (1959) which held that subsequent federal or state prosecution for the same charges did 
not violate the Double Jeopardy clause of the Constitution. 
White was overruled by People v Nutt (2005), and People v Davis (2005) overturned 
Cooper. Arkansas (F)94 and New Jersey (FCOCA)95 were the only states to follow the holding in 
White. Otherwise, it was cited in dissent by, North Dakota96, Pennsylvania97 Tennessee98, and 
Wyoming99, and in concurring opinions by Massachusetts100 and West Virginia.101. Iowa 
(CPNF)102 , Maryland (NFCOCA)103  and New Hampshire (CPNF) (COP)104
                                                          
94 Cozzaglio v. State (1986) 
 declined to follow 
it.   
95 State v. Gregory (1975) 
96 State v. Jacobson (1996) 
97 Commonwealth v Caufman (1995) 
98 State v Black (1975)  
99 Duffy v State (1990) 
100 Commonwealth v. Gallarelli (1977) 
101 State ex rel. Johnson v. Hamilton (1980) 
102 State v. Sunclades (1981) 
103 Cousins v. State (1976) 
104 State v Gosselin (1977) 
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The citation history for Cooper was intriguing.  Only one state court followed it partially.   
New Hampshire (FCOCA)105 agreed that the court should look to the interests of the individual 
as opposed to the sovereign when determining whether multiple prosecutions were barred.    On 
the contrary, several courts specifically refused to follow it such as Arizona (NFCOCA)106, 
Connecticut (CPNF)(D)107, Florida (NFCOCA)108, Maryland (NFCOCA)109, Massachusetts 
(NF)(COP)(COP)110 Minnesota (NF)111 New Mexico (NF)112, Tennessee (NFCOCA)113 and 
Utah (CPNF (2)114. New Hampshire (NF)115
Some examples of cases involving the New Judicial Federalism that did not overrule 
prior precedent are: People v Wilder (1981), People v Sherbine (1984) and People v Sloan 
(1995).  People v Wilder involved a defendant convicted of first degree murder in the 
perpetration or attempted perpetration of a robbery (first degree felony murder) and armed 
robbery.   The court held that conviction for felony murder and the predicate felony giving rise to 
felony murder (armed robbery) violated the double jeopardy clause of the Michigan Constitution. 
Until being overturned by People v Ream (2009), Wilder was followed by two courts, New 
Mexico (SCF)
 also employed the test enunciated in Cooper and 
determined that multiple prosecutions were not barred in that case.   
116  and Pennsylvania (F)117, and not followed by two others-Kansas (CPNF)118
                                                          
105 State v. Hogg (1978) 
 
106 State v. Poland (1982) 
107 State v. Moeller (1979) 
108 Booth v. State (1983) 
109 Bailey v. State (1985) 
110 Commonwealth v. Cepulonis  
111 State v. Aune (1985)  
112 State v Rogers (1977) 
113 Lavon v. State (1979) 
114 State v Franklin (1987) 
115 State v. Heinz (1979) 
116 State v. Contreras (1995) 
117 Commonwealth v. Houtz (1981) 
118 State v. Crump (1982) 
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and Utah (SCNF)119.  Vermont (COP)120 cited a case which quoted Wilder and had to do with 
lesser and greater offenses, and Wyoming (C) 121(D)122
Sherbine and Sloan, although involving differing facts, reached the conclusion that in 
situations where a warrant is issued based upon a violation or violations of statutory affidavit 
requirements, the evidence must be excluded.  Both cases were overruled by People v Hawkins 
(2003) Hawkins held that there was nothing in the statute mandating exclusion of evidence for 
those violations, and that such a determination was better left to the legislature. Sherbine was 
cited in one Texas (D)
 cited it in concurrence and dissent.  
123 dissenting opinion and as part of dicta by Vermont (COP)124
In People v Beavers (1975) , the court declined to follow United States v White (1971) 
and held that electronic transmission to law enforcement of a conversation between a suspect and 
an undercover officer, without  a warrant or consent, was impermissible. In White, the Supreme 
Court found:   
.  As far as 
I could tell, Sloan was not cited by any state court for any reason. 
…no practical difference, for Fourth Amendment purposes, between the risk that one’s 
confidential communications may be disclosed by the person to whom they are made and 
the risk that the person in whom one confides may be wearing an electronic monitor 
(Wilkes, 1974, p. 881-882).   
 
The Michigan Court, relying upon Justice Harlan’s dissent, saw the matter differently: 
 
“…we are persuaded by the logic of Justice Harlan which recognizes a significant 
distinction between assuming the risk that communications directed to one party may 
subsequently be repeated to others and the simultaneous monitoring of a conversation by 
the uninvited ear of a third party functioning in cooperation with one of the participants 
yet unknown to the other (Wilkes, 1974, p. 882 quoting Beavers)  
 
                                                          
119 State v. McCovey (1990) 
120 State v. Grega (1998) 
121 Cook v. State (1992) 
122 Birr v. State (1987)  
123 Eisenhauer v. State (1988) 
124 State v. Ballou (1987) 
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The court went on to conclude that participant monitoring without a search warrant violated the 
Michigan Constitution. Until overruled by People v Collins (1991), Hawaii (CPNF)125, 
Massachusetts (NFCOCA)126, New Hampshire, (CPNF)127, and Ohio (NF)128 specifically 
declined to follow the ruling.  Louisiana (FCOCA)129 followed it as did Alaska (F) (D)130, but 
over a strong dissent.  Alaska (COP)131 cited it for the fact that the ruling was not retroactive. 
California, Minnesota, Montana (COP)132, Oregon (COP)133, and South Dakota (COP)134 cited it 
with other states for the general proposition that states may grant greater rights under state 
constitutions than the federal, Colorado (COP)135 West Virginia (COP)136 cited it along with 
other states as an example of a state court not following White.  Massachusetts (COP)137 138 and 
Wisconsin (COP)139
 People v Taylor (1997) involved the warrantless search of a car and its occupants based 
exclusively upon the smell of marijuana emanating from the car.  In the course of the search, 
police found weapons and the defendants were convicted of multiple charges.  The court held 
that the smell of marijuana, standing alone, was not a sufficient justification for a search, but 
could be one element in a “totality of the circumstances” test.  
 relied upon the portion of the opinion that testimony from a participant is 
not excluded,    
                                                          
125 State v. Lester (1982) 
126 Commonwealth v. Thorpe (1981) 
127 State v. Kilgus (1986) 
128 State v. Geraldo (1981) 
129 State v. Reeves (1982) 
130 State v. Glass (1978) 
131 State v. Glass (1979) 
132 State v. Brackman (1978) 
133 State v. Caraher (1982) 
134 State v. Opperman (1976) 
135 People v. Velasquez (1982)  
136 Blackburn v. State (1982) 
137 Commonwealth v. Blood (1987) 
138 Commonwealth v. Jarabek (1981) 
139 State v. Smith (1976) 
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 No court followed that part of the ruling.  Tennessee (COP)140 cited it with numerous 
other courts in a long string cite for the test to follow in determining when a questioning 
becomes a seizure. That was it. On the other hand, People v Kazmierczak (2000), which 
overruled Taylor and held that the smell of marijuana, standing alone, was indeed sufficient 
justification for a search, was followed by Iowa (SCF)141, Massachusetts (FCOCA)142 and Ohio 
(FCOCA)143 New York (COP)144 cited it in an appendix to its opinion cataloging states which 
cite the case of Wren v United States with approval, and Florida (COP)145
People v Jackson (1974), held that a defendant was entitled to counsel at all stages of the 
judicial process, including at pretrial lineups and photographic identifications (Wilkes, 1974) 
This holding was contrary to the Supreme Court cases of Kirby v Illinois (1972) and United 
States v Ash (1973) which held that there is no federal right to counsel during lineups and 
photographic identifications (Wilkes, 1974)  
 cited it along with 
numerous other states to show the split of authority regarding whether the smell of marijuana 
was sufficient probable cause for a search.         
The independent state ground was not an interpretation of the Michigan Constitution, per 
se, but the Michigan Rules of Evidence.  The court was concerned that the quality of such 
identifications may be tainted by unfair procedures, and based the authority for its decision upon 
the Court’s right: “’…to establish rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings in 
Michigan courts’” (Wilkes, 1974, p. 887 quoting Jackson).  
                                                          
140 State v. Daniel (2000) 
141 State v. Watts (2011) 
142 Commonwealth v. Garden (2007) 
143 State v. Moore (2000) 
144 People v. Robinson (2001) 
145 State v Betz (2001) 
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Jackson also involved statutory interpretation and the discretion of a trial judge to admit 
or suppress evidence.  The evidentiary statute stated, in relevant part:  
No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any civil or criminal case or proceeding by 
reason of his interest in the event of the same as a party or otherwise or by reason of his 
having been convicted of any crime; but such interest or conviction may be shown for the 
purpose of affecting his credibility (MCLA 600.2159). 
 
The trial judge construed the language of the statute as requiring him to allow evidence of prior 
convictions if requested by the prosecutor. The Supreme Court reversed and held that the 
language: “…may be shown for the purpose of affecting his credibility” granted a judge 
discretion to exclude the evidence, and that the trial judge erred in failing to recognize that 
discretion.    
 The portion of the decision requiring an attorney at photographic arrays or lineups was 
followed by one court-California (FCOCA)146.  It was not followed by The District of Columbia 
(NFCOCA)147 Massachusetts (CPNF)148  Rhode Island (NFCOCA) (D (2))149 and South Dakota 
(NF)150 .  The holding allowing judicial discretion to exclude evidence of prior convictions was 
followed by Massachusetts (FCOCA)151, New Jersey (SCF)152 and Rhode Island (F)153  It was 
not followed by Washington (NFCOCA)154, and was cited in dissent by New York (D)155 and 
Wyoming (D)156 157 158. Minnesota (COP)159
                                                          
146 People v. Bustamante (1981) 
 cited it along with numerous other states as 
147 Parks v. United States (1982) 
148 Commonwealth v. Jackson (1995) 
149 State v. Delahunt (1979) 
150 State v. Miller (1976) 
151 Commonwealth v. Maguire (1984) 
152 State v. Sands (1978) 
153 State v. Bennett (1979) 
154 State v. Ruzicka (1977) 
155 People v. Hawkins (1982) 
156Brown v. State (1991)  
157 Smallwood v. State (1989) 
158 Charpentier v. State (1987) 
159 Friedman v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety (1991) 
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examples of states providing greater protection than the federal constitution, and South Dakota 
(COP)160
 These results were unexpected.  High citation counts may indicate prestige, but they are 
not an indicator of influence.  Similarly, positive evaluations by the legal community may 
indicate prestige, but there is no indication of influence at least in the narrow area of the New 
Judicial Federalism.  I discuss possible reasons why in the next section   
 cited it as an example of the only state in the union to require written findings of fact in 
a criminal bench trial.    
 
Explanation for  Unexpected Results  
 
Clearly, courts that are prestigious among particular (limited) constituencies were 
unable to influence other courts to follow them in expanding defendants’ rights.  There is 
apparently no such thing as prestige in general – only prestige among certain constituencies, 
which, even within a legal community, may be highly differentiated. 
Institutional factors such as the methods of judicial recruitment may outweigh any 
prestige effects. Judges vulnerable to the electorate will likely be less willing to extend the rights 
of criminal suspects, as criminal suspects are not likely to be a popular group with the public. 
In other words, justices completely insulated from and unaccountable to the electorate have 
much more leeway to rule without fear of repercussions (Wefing, 1998),  
By contrast, “In thirty eight states, Supreme Court justices face some type of popular 
election” (Mulcahy, 1999, p. 895).  That is a total of 76%.  Obviously, if a main ingredient of 
judicial independence is lack of electoral accountability, then the majority of state supreme 
courts are obviously unsuitable. Those courts would likely have every incentive to avoid making 
                                                          
160 State v. Means (1978) 
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liberal or progressive decisions, or to cite such decisions in a derisive manner.  In fact, the late 
justice Otto Kaus, when referring to judicial elections remarked: "… it was like finding a 
crocodile in your bathtub when you go in to shave in the morning. You know it's there, and you 
try not to think about it, but it's hard to think about much else while you're shaving." (Uelman, 
1997, p. 1133) 
This clearly applies to California. In commenting upon a decision of the California court 
led by Malcolm Lucas, who succeeded Bird, Blum observes: “Where once the court was unafraid 
to lead the law into new and untracked areas, it now seems content to leave the leading to others” 
(Blum 1991 p 48).  Similarly: “…the court has also expressed a preference for deferring policy 
decisions affecting important social issues and commercial relationships to legislative decision 
making” (Blum, 1991, p. 50).      
Additional factors unique to New Jersey which make the court even more invulnerable 
are the absence of initiative and referendum allowing the people to place issues on the ballot 
overturning court decisions (Wefing, 1998), and the  rare use of constitutional amendment 
(Wefing, 1998)  These are effective tools available to the people of California.  As noted by 
Thompson, decisions of the California court regarding the death penalty, the exclusionary rule, 
busing as a remedy for segregation were overruled by the people through the initiative process. 
(Thompson, 1988)  
A closely related concept is the phenomena of a public backlash against unpopular 
decisions.  As vividly illustrated by the California experience, if voters are sufficiently upset 
and aroused by an active campaign, there exists a real possibility that they will “throw the 
bums out of office.”  The additional weapon of initiative and referendum to overturn 
unpopular decisions, works in tandem with the ballot box to keep a court in check.  Again, as 
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noted, the people of New Jersey do not have these options. They may become angry with 
unpopular decisions, but are effectively precluded from doing anything about it.  
It seems clear that a court wishing to expand the rights of criminal suspects must also be 
unaccountable to the electorate. “There is ample empirical and anecdotal evidence demonstrating 
that justices, ‘regardless of how safe their positions are [,]… often fear voters’” (Devins , 2009,  
p. 1664).  There are also numerous articles and studies showing that state Supreme Court justices 
do indeed take electoral consequences into account when voting (Devins, 2009).  
This invariably means taking a more conservative position to avoid voter retaliation.  For 
example, a Louisiana state supreme court justice : “…stated that he does not dissent in death 
penalty cases against an opinion of the court to affirm a defendant's conviction and sentence, 
expressly because of a perceived voter sanction, in spite of his deeply felt personal preferences to 
the contrary” (Hall, 1987, p. 1120). Similarly: “A Georgia Supreme Court justice acknowledged 
that the elected justices of that court may have overlooked errors, leaving federal courts to 
remedy them via habeas corpus, because ‘[federal judges] have lifetime appointments. Let them 
make the hard decisions.’" (Bright and Keenan, 1995,  p. 799)   
On the other hand: “On socially divisive issues, politically insulated justices would be 
more apt to be legal policy entrepreneurs than justices who run substantial risks of either losing 
reelection or having their decisions overturned by a constitutional amendment or legislation” 
(Devins and Mankster, 2010, p. 471)  However, as noted, only a few state supreme courts share 
that political insulation and the justices of those courts have good reason to avoid voting policy 
preferences which go against popular opinion.  
However, a factor which may change the equation for the New Jersey Supreme Court is 
the election of Governor Chris Christie, who made a campaign promise to change it by 
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appointing conservative justices (Oks, 2011).  Governor Christie specifically stated:”’ I’m 
hopeful that I’ll be able to appoint justices who understand that their job is to interpret the law, 
not make the law, and to interpret the constitution, and not amend the constitution from the 
bench.  That’s what the Supreme Court has done over and over again”’ (Haddon, 2012).   True to 
his word, he became the first governor of New Jersey to refuse to reappoint a sitting justice since 
the new constitution was adopted. (Oks, 2011) 
 
Whether Governor Christie intends to follow through on his promise is an open question 
at this point, as two of his most recent nominees have raised serious concerns among those 
advocating judicial restraint. For example, Carrie Severino of the Judicial Crisis Network, in 
referring to nominee Bruce Harris asserts: “There are two possible explanations, neither 
flattering to Governor Christie. The governor’s office was either astoundingly incompetent in 
vetting Harris, or Christie has quite resoundingly betrayed his campaign promises” (Severino, 
2012).  Time will tell.    
  Another possible reason is that the prestige of the federal courts and especially the 
United States Supreme Court simply exceeds the prestige of even the most prestigious state 
courts.  Additionally, the federal courts' authoritative determination that particular safeguards are 
sufficient to protect a defendant's legitimate interests will be very weighty where there are both 
political imperatives and ideological dispositions not to give criminal defendants any more than 
bare minimum rights.  
Finally, it is hardly clear that the prestige of one set of sister courts vis-a-vis another 
figures substantially in state court decisions, even in more favorable circumstances. 
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 My findings show the dangers of not clearly defining terms or improperly conflating 
them. High citation counts and prestige among the legal community did not translate into 
influence. (Courts actually following the cases)  It also shows the difficulties with relying upon a 
raw citation count. Though tedious and time-consuming, the only to know for sure what citations 
mean is to actually read the case employing the citation to determine how and why.  Any future 
research should focus more upon the qualitative as opposed to quantitative aspects.       
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Appendix A 
Tables 
Table 1 
Symbols used 
 
Action Symbol 
Followed F 
Not  Followed NF 
String Cite Followed SCF 
String Cite Not Followed SCNF 
Cited by Party-Followed CPF 
Cited by Party-Not Followed CPNF 
Followed-Cited with Other Citations or Authorities FCOCA 
Dissent D 
Concurrence C 
Cited for Other Purpose COP 
Counsel Counsel 
Not Followed-Cited with Other Citations or Authorities NFCOCA 
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Table 2 Positive normative evaluations of the New Jersey, Michigan and California  
    Supreme Courts finding prestige. 
 
 
Study Topic Addressed Summary Quote 
Glick 
1991 
Innovations in “right 
to die” cases 
It probably is not a coincidence that supreme courts in 
New Jersey and Massachusetts produced distinctive 
policies early in the process-especially New Jersey, which 
appears on every list of innovative or prestigious courts” 
(Glick, 1991, p. 111).  
 
Tarr and 
Porter 
1998 
Comparison of 
various state supreme 
courts 
Since World War II the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
assumed a role of leadership in the development of legal 
doctrine, thereby earning itself a national reputation for 
activism and liberal reformism (Tarr & Porter, 1998, p. 
184); 
 
…the New Jersey Supreme Court seems to exemplify 
…the activist ‘lighthouse’ courts that have assumed a 
leadership role in national legal development (Tarr & 
Porter, 1998, p. 268) 
 
Wefing 
1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Review of New Jersey 
Supreme Court cases 
In the last fifty years, the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
attained a reputation as one of the leading state supreme 
courts in the United States.  This reputation has been noted 
by numerous scholar and authors…  (Wefing, 1997, 
p.701); 
 
Additionally, the court has enthusiastically embraced the 
New Federalism movement.  As the United States Supreme 
Court has become more conservative in recent years, many 
state courts have chosen to use their own constitutions to 
grant greater rights than given under the United States 
Constitution.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has 
regularly done this. The New Jersey Supreme Court has 
granted greater rights to defendants under the New Jersey 
search and seizure provision than the United States 
Supreme Court has given under the Fourth Amendment  
(Wefing, 1997, p. 705) 
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Russello 
2002 
Speculation about 
future trends for New 
Jersey Court 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has built a reputation as an 
intellectually rigorous and forcefully progressive state 
supreme court (Russello, 2002, p. 655); 
He further asserts that the court from 1979-1996 under the 
leadership of Chief Justice Robert Wilentz was a stellar 
example of the “new federalism” urged by Justice Brennan 
(Russello, 2002).    
  
Oks 2011 Discussion of future 
trends for New Jersey 
Court 
“…since 1947, the New Jersey Supreme Court has served 
as a model for the nation…” (Oks, 2011, p.132 quoting 
Etish 2010); 
 
She additionally refers to: “The Court’s national reputation 
as a judicial leader…” (Oks, 2011, p. 132).   
 
 
 
 
 
Hagan 
1988 
Examination of 
activism on state 
supreme courts 
California, New Jersey, and Michigan have been the 
subject of extensive analysis.  They are also regarded as 
the most activist and innovative state supreme courts in the 
nation (Hagan, 1988, p. 97 ).   
 
Parker 
1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examination of 
Michigan Supreme 
Court jurisprudence 
The Michigan Supreme Court enjoyed a reputation for 
activism and innovation in recent decades.  The Court took 
an active role in the development of civil liberties issues 
and tort law innovations” (Parker, 1996, p. 345).   
 
Schneider 
2008 
Examination of 
Michigan Supreme 
Court criminal 
law/procedure 
It (the Michigan Supreme Court) was apparently 
undistinguished until the 1970’s when it gained a 
reputation for activism (Schneider, 2008); 
 
It was during this period that the court overturned 
precedents in the areas of criminal law, torts, and contracts, 
granting greater protections for suspects, broader liability 
for alleged tortfeasors, and allowing the court to determine 
whether a contractual clause was “reasonable”  
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Porter 
1978 
Discussion of New 
Judicial Federalism 
after the Warren 
Court 
The California court, considered to be the most prestigious 
in the nation has a history of civil rights activism” (Porter, 
1978, p 57). 
 
Blum 
1991 
Discussion of new 
trends in California 
court opinions after 
the Bird Court 
 
Long before the controversial appointment of Bird in 1977, 
the court had acquired a reputation as the nation’s premier 
state court, largely on the basis of its innovative, scholarly, 
and bold leadership in the fields of constitutional, criminal, 
and tort law (Blum, 1991, p. 48);  
 
The court’s reputation for greatness dates back to 1940 … 
(Blum, 1991, p. 49); 
 
It was considered to be the premier state supreme court 
basically because of all the innovative opinions that would 
come from California” (Blum, 1991, p. 50) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Negative Normative Evaluations of the New Jersey, Michigan and                        
California Supreme Courts inferring or concluding a loss of prestige. 
Study Topic Addressed Summary Quote 
Blum 
1991 
 …the California Court has been dislodged as the most 
“”prestigious” state court by the New Jersey Supreme Court, 
long known for its innovative record in such areas as 
exclusionary zoning and school finance” (Blum, 1991, p. 49) 
Pease 
1994 
Survey of California 
court opinions in 
criminal law, among 
other areas 
Even before the appointment of Chief Justice Rose Bird 
in1977, ‘the court had acquired the reputation as the nation's 
premier state court, largely on the basis of its innovative, 
scholarly and bold leadership in the fields of constitutional, 
criminal and tort law’. Now with Chief Justice Lucas at the 
helm since Bird was unseated in 1986, the court is entrenched 
in its conservative nature and its mainstream posture (Pease, 
1994, p. 109-110) 
Carbone 
1998 
 Speculation about 
future trends for 
New Jersey Court 
Recently…the New Jersey Supreme Court has appeared to 
depart from the liberalism the court once embraced (Carbone, 
1999, p. 363).  Further: “Given these appointments of 
moderate jurists, New Jersey’s legacy of liberalism in the 
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sphere of privacy protection and criminal procedure appears 
to be coming to a close" (Cabone, 1999, p. 363) 
Mulcahy 
2001 
Discussion of how 
to transform 
California court 
Although the California Supreme Court remains sound in 
stature, clearly the progressive era of judicial policymaking, 
activist decisions, and national prominence is over (Mulcahy 
2001, p. 109-110 emphasis added)  
Russello 
 2002 
Speculation about 
future trends for 
New Jersey Court 
This rapid change in the Court’s membership may have 
lasting effects on the Court’s jurisprudence, which may in 
turn affect other state courts for which the New Jersey 
Supreme Court has been a model ( Russello, 2002, p. 567) 
Kelso 
2010 
Tribute to Judge 
Ron George 
During his 19-year tenure on the Supreme Court, 14 years as 
its chief, Ron George successfully re-established the 
preeminence of California’s highest court as one of the 
leading state courts in the country. The court’s national 
reputation and prominence had taken a steep dive in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, and the failure of three justices to win 
their retention elections in 1986 further damaged the court's 
prestige and credibility. In the aftermath of the 1986 election 
debacle, the court swung hard to the right (Kelso, 2010) 
Delaney 
2001 
Discussion of 
Michigan court 
cases overruling 
prior precedent. 
Author accuses the court of having a conservative political 
agenda when it overruled numerous precedents as opposed to 
a fidelity to “textualism” or “structutalism” (Delaney, 2001) 
Serra 
2004 
Discussion of 
Michigan court 
cases overruling 
prior precedent. 
“…the transparent efforts of the Michigan Supreme Court to 
reach conservative results that limit and weaken human rights 
protection, lend strong credence to the argument that the court 
is engaging in unprecedented activism toward the end of 
reducing civil rights protection and increasing governmental 
power over individual liberty” (Serra, 2004, p. 956) 
Miller 
2006 
Discussion of 
Michigan Court 
cases overruling 
prior precedent. 
Author suggests that Michigan Court was exercising “’raw 
power’” and engaging in ‘”judicial politics” in overturning 
prior decisions 
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Table 4 Empirical evaluations of prestige 
Article Methodology Conclusions  CA    MI     NJ 
Mott  Count of citations by sister courts 
1920 
                      4th     7th     10th 
Caldiera Count of citations by sister courts 
1975 
                       1st     10th    3rd 
Dear and 
Jessen 
Count of cases followed by sister 
courts per Shepard’s citations   
 
California number one in the 
country.  
 
Table 5 
Summary of Cases Cited by Sister Courts, 1975 
Totals 
Courts       F      NF    Other   Totals  
California 15%  5%   80%    
  114  37   611   764  
 
Michigan  25%  8%   70%   
   59  20   160   239 
 
New Jersey 22%  7%  71%   
   58  18   188   264  
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Table 6 
Summary of Cases Cited by Sister Courts, 1975 
Criminal Law and Procedure as a percentage of total cases cited 
Courts       F      NF    Other   Totals 
California 8%  4%  31%   42% 
  63  29   244   336 
 
Michigan  12%  5%   31%   46% 
  27  11   73   111 
 
New Jersey 5%  3%  20%   28% 
  12  9   54   75 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Summary of Cases Cited by Sister Courts, 1975 
Criminal Law and Procedure broken down by category 
Courts         F       NF    Other   Totals 
California 19%  9%   72% 
  63  29   244   336 
 
Michigan  24%  10%   66% 
  27  11   73   111 
 
New Jersey 16%  12%  72% 
  12  9   54   75 
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Table 8 
Summary of Cases Cited by Sister Courts, 1998 
Totals 
Courts       F      NF    Other   Totals  
California 23%  9%  68%         
  40  15   120  175 
 
Michigan  39%  6%  55%    
  20  3   28   51 
 
New Jersey 28%  9%  63%     
   25  8  33   90  
 
 
 
Table 9 
Summary of Cases Cited by Sister Courts, 1998 
Criminal Law and Procedure as a percentage of total cases cited 
Courts       F      NF    Other   Totals 
California 4%  1%  37%  21% 
  7  2   28  37 
 
Michigan  22%  2%  10%   33% 
  11  1  5   17 
 
New Jersey 2%  2%  8%   12% 
  2  2  7   11 
 
 
 
 
89 
 
 
Table 10 
Summary of Cases Cited by Sister Courts, 1998 
Criminal Law and Procedure broken down by category 
Courts       F      NF    Other   Totals  
California 19%  5%  76%         
  7  2   28   37 
 
Michigan  65%  6%  29%    
  27  1   5   17 
 
New Jersey 18%  18%  64%     
  2  2   7  11  
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Appendix B 
Breakdown by Individual State 
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California 1975 Totals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F NF SCF SCNF CPF CPNF FCOCA D C COP Counsel NFCOCA Total CA Law
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 4 0 1%
Alaska 15 5 3 1 0 4 28 5 2 12 0 0 75 6 10%
Arizona 3 0 1 0 0 2 10 3 0 2 0 1 22 3%
Arkansas 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0%
California 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Colorado 3 0 10 0 0 5 6 2 1 2 0 1 30 4%
Connectic 0 2 3 0 0 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 11 1%
Delaware 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 1%
DC 3 2 2 1 0 1 3 0 0 5 0 0 17 2%
Florida 6 0 1 1 0 0 1 3 0 1 0 0 13 2%
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0%
Hawaii 0 1 4 0 0 4 4 0 0 1 0 0 14 2%
Iowa 5 2 3 0 0 1 6 1 0 1 0 0 19 2%
Idaho 5 0 5 0 0 2 7 10 5 8 0 0 42 5%
Illinois 3 0 2 2 0 0 5 3 1 2 0 0 18 2%
Indiana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Kansas 2 1 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 1 9 1%
Kentucky 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Louisiana 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 3 1 0 0 0 9 1%
Maryland 0 3 5 0 0 0 6 2 0 1 0 2 19 2%
Massachus 2 1 4 0 0 2 7 3 0 2 0 0 21 3%
Maine 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 12 2%
Michigan 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 8 3 1 0 0 19 2%
Minnestoa 4 0 1 1 0 3 1 2 1 0 0 1 14 2%
Mississipp 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 0 0 9 1%
Missouri 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 2 0 0 9 1%
Montana 6 0 1 0 0 8 6 7 0 1 0 1 30 4%
Nebraska 1 1 1 0 0 1 4 0 3 1 0 0 12 2%
Nevada 2 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 7 1%
New Hamp 5 1 0 0 0 0 7 3 0 1 0 0 17 2%
New Jerse 4 2 3 1 0 1 4 2 2 5 0 2 26 3%
New Mexi 4 0 3 0 0 2 5 1 0 4 0 0 19 2%
New York 0 2 4 1 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 13 2%
North Caro 1 0 2 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 10 1%
North Dak 2 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 2 4 0 0 16 2%
Ohio 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 3 0 0 0 1 10 1%
Oklahoma 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 5 1%
Oregon 3 1 2 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 13 2%
Pennsylva 3 0 0 1 0 0 3 2 0 1 0 0 10 1%
Rhode Isla 0 0 2 0 0 2 3 0 0 1 0 2 10 1%
South Caro 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 7 1%
South Dak 4 0 3 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 1 16 2%
Tennessee 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0%
Texas 0 0 3 1 0 2 4 0 0 1 0 0 11 1%
Utah 4 0 6 0 0 5 10 4 0 4 0 0 33 4%
Vermont 2 0 1 0 0 0 11 0 0 2 0 0 16 2%
Virginia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Washingto 4 0 0 0 0 2 5 6 0 5 0 0 22 3%
West Virgi 5 0 9 0 0 0 7 2 0 2 0 1 26 3%
Wisconsin 3 1 2 0 0 0 3 3 0 3 0 0 15 2%
Wyoming 3 2 2 0 0 0 2 6 2 4 0 0 21 3%
Totals 114 37 101 12 2 55 201 103 29 92 1 17 764
% Total 15% 5% 13% 2% 0% 7% 26% 13% 4% 12% 0% 2%
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Michigan 1975 Totals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 F NF SCF SCNF CPF CPNF FCOCA D C COP Counsel NFCOCA Total MI Law
Alabama 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Alaska 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 3%
Arizona 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1%
Arkansas 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1%
California 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 2%
Colorado 3 4 4 0 0 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 17 7%
Connectic 5 1 2 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 13 5%
Delaware 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
DC 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1%
Florida 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1%
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Hawaii 5 1 1 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 11 5%
Iowa 1 0 3 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 1 11 5%
Idaho 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 6 3%
Illinois 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 6 3%
Indiana 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 1%
Kansas 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 1%
Kentucky 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 1%
Louisiana 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 5%
Massachus 2 2 2 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 11 2%
Maryland 2 0 3 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 11 0%
Maine 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5%
Michigan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Minnestoa 6 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 11 1%
Mississipp 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Missouri 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 2%
Montana 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Nebraska 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 3%
Nevada 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0%
NewHamp 2 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 3%
New Jerse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3%
New Mexi 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 8 1%
New York 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 6 4%
North Caro 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 2%
North Dak 3 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 9 1%
Ohio 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 5 1%
Oklahoma 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1%
Oregon 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 0%
Pennsylva 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 1%
Rhode Isla 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5%
South Caro 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2%
South Dak 4 0 4 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 12 1%
Tennessee 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 3%
Texas 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0%
Utah 2 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 1%
Vermont 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Virginia 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4%
Washingto 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
West Virgi 2 1 3 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 9 4%
Wisconsin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Wyoming 3 2 0 1 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 10 0%
Totals 59 20 53 8 3 17 29 40 4 1 0 5 239
% Total 25% 8% 22% 3% 1% 7% 12% 17% 2% 0% 0% 2%
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New Jersey 1975 Totals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F NF SCF SCNF CPF CPNF FCOCA D C COP Counsel NFCOCA Total NJ Law Applies
Alabama 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 6 2%
Alaska 0 3 2 2 0 1 1 0 1 4 0 0 14 5%
Arizona 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0 0 6 2%
Arkansas 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 2%
California 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 0 7 3%
Colorado 1 0 3 0 0 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 9 3%
Connectic 1 0 4 1 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 10 4%
Delaware 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 7 3%
DC 6 0 2 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 13 5%
Florida 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 2%
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Hawaii 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1%
Iowa 3 1 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 9 3%
Idaho 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 5 2%
Illinois 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 7 3%
Indiana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Kansas 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1%
Kentucky 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 1%
louisiana 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1%
Massachus 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Maryland 1 4 6 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 16 6%
Maine 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 2%
Michigan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Minnesota 2 0 2 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 10 4%
Mississipp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Missouri 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Montana 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Nebraska 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Nevada 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1%
New Hamp 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 12 5%
New Jerse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
New Mexi 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1%
New York 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
North Caro 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
North Dak 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 2%
Ohio 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 7 3%
Oklahoma 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 2%
Oregon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Pennsylva 6 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 13 5%
Rhode Isla 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 1%
South Caro 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
South Dak 2 1 2 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 10 4%
Tennessee 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Texas 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1%
Utah 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 7 3%
Vermont 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 0 0 7 3%
Virginia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Washingto 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 6 2%
West Virgi 10 0 3 1 0 2 1 0 0 5 0 0 22 8%
Wisconsin 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 6 2%
Wyoming 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0%
Totals 58 18 57 9 3 13 39 29 5 31 0 2 264
% Total 22% 7% 22% 3% 1% 5% 15% 11% 2% 12% 0% 1%
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California 1975 Criminal Law and Procedure 
 
 
 
F NF SCF SCNF CPF CPNF FCOCA D C COP Counsel NFCOCA Total CA Law
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 4 0 1%
Alaska 15 5 3 1 0 4 28 5 2 12 0 0 75 6 10%
Arizona 3 0 1 0 0 2 10 3 0 2 0 1 22 3%
Arkansas 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0%
California 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Colorado 3 0 10 0 0 5 6 2 1 2 0 1 30 4%
Connectic 0 2 3 0 0 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 11 1%
Delaware 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 1%
DC 3 2 2 1 0 1 3 0 0 5 0 0 17 2%
Florida 6 0 1 1 0 0 1 3 0 1 0 0 13 2%
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0%
Hawaii 0 1 4 0 0 4 4 0 0 1 0 0 14 2%
Iowa 5 2 3 0 0 1 6 1 0 1 0 0 19 2%
Idaho 5 0 5 0 0 2 7 10 5 8 0 0 42 5%
Illinois 3 0 2 2 0 0 5 3 1 2 0 0 18 2%
Indiana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Kansas 2 1 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 1 9 1%
Kentucky 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Louisiana 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 3 1 0 0 0 9 1%
Maryland 0 3 5 0 0 0 6 2 0 1 0 2 19 2%
Massachus 2 1 4 0 0 2 7 3 0 2 0 0 21 3%
Maine 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 12 2%
Michigan 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 8 3 1 0 0 19 2%
Minnestoa 4 0 1 1 0 3 1 2 1 0 0 1 14 2%
Mississipp 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 0 0 9 1%
Missouri 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 2 0 0 9 1%
Montana 6 0 1 0 0 8 6 7 0 1 0 1 30 4%
Nebraska 1 1 1 0 0 1 4 0 3 1 0 0 12 2%
Nevada 2 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 7 1%
New Hamp 5 1 0 0 0 0 7 3 0 1 0 0 17 2%
New Jerse 4 2 3 1 0 1 4 2 2 5 0 2 26 3%
New Mexi 4 0 3 0 0 2 5 1 0 4 0 0 19 2%
New York 0 2 4 1 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 13 2%
North Caro 1 0 2 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 10 1%
North Dak 2 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 2 4 0 0 16 2%
Ohio 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 3 0 0 0 1 10 1%
Oklahoma 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 5 1%
Oregon 3 1 2 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 13 2%
Pennsylva 3 0 0 1 0 0 3 2 0 1 0 0 10 1%
Rhode Isla 0 0 2 0 0 2 3 0 0 1 0 2 10 1%
South Caro 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 7 1%
South Dak 4 0 3 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 1 16 2%
Tennessee 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0%
Texas 0 0 3 1 0 2 4 0 0 1 0 0 11 1%
Utah 4 0 6 0 0 5 10 4 0 4 0 0 33 4%
Vermont 2 0 1 0 0 0 11 0 0 2 0 0 16 2%
Virginia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Washingto 4 0 0 0 0 2 5 6 0 5 0 0 22 3%
West Virgi 5 0 9 0 0 0 7 2 0 2 0 1 26 3%
Wisconsin 3 1 2 0 0 0 3 3 0 3 0 0 15 2%
Wyoming 3 2 2 0 0 0 2 6 2 4 0 0 21 3%
Totals 114 37 101 12 2 55 201 103 29 92 1 17 764
15% 5% 13% 2% 0% 7% 26% 13% 4% 12% 0% 2%
F NF SCF SCNF CPF CPNF FCOCA D C COP Counsel NFCOCA
CLP/CON 63 29 52 9 2 22 88 9 4 42 0 16 336
% TOTAL 8% 4% 7% 1% 0% 3% 12% 8% 1% 5% 0% 2% 44%
F NF SCF SCNF CPF CPNF FCOCA D C COP Counsel NFCOCA
CLP/CON 63 29 52 9 2 22 88 9 4 42 0 16 336
% CLP 19% 9% 15% 3% 1% 7% 26% 19% 1% 13% 0% 5% 100%
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Michigan 1975 Criminal Law and Procedure 
 
 
F NF SCF SCNF CPF CPNF FCOCA D C COP Counsel NFCOCA Total MI Law
Alabama 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Alaska 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 3%
Arizona 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1%
Arkansas 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1%
California 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 2%
Colorado 3 4 4 0 0 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 17 7%
Connectic 5 1 2 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 13 6%
Delaware 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
DC 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1%
Florida 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1%
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Hawaii 5 1 1 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 11 5%
Iowa 1 0 3 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 1 11 5%
Idaho 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 6 3%
Illinois 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 6 3%
Indiana 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 1%
Kansas 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 1%
Kentucky 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 1%
Louisiana 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 5%
Massachus 2 2 2 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 11 2%
Maryland 2 0 3 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 11 0%
Maine 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5%
Michigan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Minnestoa 6 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 11 1%
Mississipp 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Missouri 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 2%
Montana 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Nebraska 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 3%
Nevada 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0%
NewHamp 2 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 2%
New Jerse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1%
New Mexi 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 1%
New York 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 4%
North Caro 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2%
North Dak 3 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 9 1%
Ohio 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 5 1%
Oklahoma 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1%
Oregon 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 0%
Pennsylva 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 1%
Rhode Isla 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5%
South Caro 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2%
South Dak 4 0 4 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 12 1%
Tennessee 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 3%
Texas 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0%
Utah 2 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 1%
Vermont 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Virginia 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4%
Washingto 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
West Virgi 2 1 3 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 9 4%
Wisconsin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Wyoming 3 2 0 1 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 10 0%
Totals 57 20 53 8 3 16 27 38 4 0 0 4 230
25% 9% 23% 3% 1% 7% 12% 17% 2% 0% 0% 2%
F NF SCF SCNF CPF CPNF FCOCA D C COP Counsel NFCOCA
CLP/CON 27 11 29 1 1 7 17 7 1 8 0 2 111
% TOTAL 12% 5% 13% 0% 0% 3% 7% 3% 0% 3% 0% 1% 48%
F NF SCF SCNF CPF CPNF FCOCA D C COP Counsel NFCOCA
CLP/CON 27 11 29 1 1 7 17 7 1 8 0 2 111
% CLP 24% 10% 26% 1% 1% 6% 15% 6% 1% 7% 0% 2% 100%
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New Jersey 1975 Criminal Law and Procedure 
 
 
F NF SCF SCNF CPF CPNF FCOCA D C COP Counsel NFCOCA Total NJ Law Applies
Alabama 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 6 2%
Alaska 0 3 2 2 0 1 1 0 1 4 0 0 14 5%
Arizona 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0 0 6 2%
Arkansas 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 2%
California 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 0 7 3%
Colorado 1 0 3 0 0 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 9 3%
Connectic 1 0 4 1 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 10 4%
Delaware 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 7 3%
DC 6 0 2 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 13 5%
Florida 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 2%
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Hawaii 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1%
Iowa 3 1 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 9 3%
Idaho 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 5 2%
Illinois 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 7 3%
Indiana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Kansas 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1%
Kentucky 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3
louisiana 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1%
Massachus 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Maryland 1 4 6 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 16 6%
Maine 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 2%
Michigan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Minnesota 2 0 2 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 10 4%
Mississipp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Missouri 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Montana 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Nebraska 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Nevada 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1%
New Hamp 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 12 5%
New Jerse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
New Mexi 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1%
New York 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
North Caro 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
North Dak 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 2%
Ohio 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 7 3%
Oklahoma 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 2%
Oregon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Pennsylva 6 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 13 5%
Rhode Isla 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 1%
South Caro 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
South Dak 2 1 2 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 10 4%
Tennessee 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Texas 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1%
Utah 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 7 3%
Vermont 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 0 0 7 3%
Virginia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0%
Washingto 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 6 2%
West Virgi 10 0 3 1 0 2 1 0 0 5 0 0 22 8%
Wisconsin 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 6 2%
Wyoming 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0%
Totals 58 18 57 9 3 13 39 29 5 31 0 2 264
22% 7% 22% 3% 1% 5% 15% 11% 2% 12% 0% 1%
F NF SCF SCNF CPF CPNF FCOCA D C COP Counsel NFCOCA
CLP/CON 12 9 19 2 0 6 15 1 0 10 0 1 75
% TOTAL 5% 7% 7% 1% 0% 2% 6% 0% 0% 4% 0% 0% 28%
F NF SCF SCNF CPF CPNF FCOCA D C COP Counsel NFCOCA
CLP/CON 12 9 19 2 0 6 15 1 0 10 0 1 75
% CLP 16% 12% 25% 3% 0% 8% 20% 1% 0% 13% 0% 1% 100%
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California 1998 Totals 
 
 
 
 
F NF SCF SCNF CPF CPNF FCOCA D C COP Counsel NFCOCA Total Ca law
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Alaska 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Arizona 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Arkansas 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1%
California 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Colorado 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 4 2%
Connectic 2 3 2 0 0 0 1 5 0 1 0 0 14 8%
Delaware 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
DC 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 4 2%
Florida 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 2%
Georgia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Hawaii 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 0 0 9 5%
Iowa 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 3%
Idaho 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Illinois 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 1%
Indiana 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 2%
Kansas 4 0 3 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 10 6%
Kentucky 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 5 3%
Louisiana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Massachus 4 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 4%
Maryland 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 5 3%
Maine 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 1%
Michigan 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1%
Minnestoa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 1%
Mississipp 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 6 3%
Missouri 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Montana 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Nebraska 2 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 8 5%
Nevada 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 3 0 5 0 0 12 7%
NewHamp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1%
New Jerse 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 2%
New Mexi 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
New York 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1%
North Caro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
North Dak 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 6 3%
Ohio 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 5 3%
Oklahoma 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1%
Oregon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Pennsylva 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Rhode Isla 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
South Caro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1%
South Dak 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1%
Tennessee 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 3%
Texas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 1%
Utah 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 2%
Vermont 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 4 2%
Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Washingto 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 0 2 0 0 9 5%
West Virgi 4 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 7 4%
Wisconsin 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 4 2%
Wyoming 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 2%
Totals 40 15 18 1 1 5 31 36 1 25 2 0 175
% TOTAL 23% 9% 10% 1% 1% 3% 18% 21% 1% 14% 1% 0%
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Michigan 1998 Totals 
 
 
 
F NF SCF SCNF CPF CPNF FCOCA D C COP Counsel NFCOCA Total Mi Law applies
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Alaska 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2%
Arizona 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Arkansas 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2%
California 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2%
Colorado 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2%
Connectic 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2%
Delaware 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
DC 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4%
Florida 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Hawaii 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 4%
Iowa 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 4%
Idaho 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Illinois 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Indiana 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2%
Kansas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2%
Kentucky 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 4%
Louisiana 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0%
Massachus 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 4%
Maryland 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 8%
Maine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Minnestoa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Michigan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Mississipp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Missouri 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Montana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Nebraska 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 6 12%
NewHamp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Nevada 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2%
New Jerse 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 6%
New Mexi 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2%
New York 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
North Caro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
North Dak 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Ohio 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Oklahoma 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2%
Oregon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Pennsylva 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Rhode Isla 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2%
South Caro 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2%
South Dak 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Tennessee 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4%
Texas 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 6 12%
Utah 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Vermont 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2%
Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Washingto 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
West Virgi 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 6%
Wisconsin 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2%
Wyoming 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2%
Totals 20 3 6 2 0 0 7 4 1 7 0 1 51
%Totals 39% 6% 12% 4% 0% 0% 14% 8% 2% 14% 0% 2%
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New Jersey 1998 Totals 
 
 
 
F NF SCF SCNF CPF CPNF FCOCA D C COP Counsel NFCOCA Total NJ Law Applies
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1%
Alaska 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Arizona 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1%
Arkansas 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2%
California 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 4%
Colorado 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Connectic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2%
Delaware 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
DC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1%
Florida 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Hawaii 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 3%
Iowa 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 6 7%
Idaho 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Illinois 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 3%
Indiana 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Kansas 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3%
Kentucky 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 3%
Louisiana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Massachus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 2%
Maryland 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 3%
Maine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 2%
Michigan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Minnestoa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Mississipp 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Missouri 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 2%
Montana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Nebraska 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 3%
Nevada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
NewHamp 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2%
New Jerse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
New Mexi 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 2%
New York 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1%
North Caro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
North Dak 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 7%
Ohio 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 7 8%
Oklahoma 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Oregon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Pennsylva 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 3%
Rhode Isla 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
South Caro 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 3%
South Dak 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 3%
Tennessee 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 2%
Texas 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Utah 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Vermont 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 3%
Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Washingto 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2%
West Virgi 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 5 6%
Wisconsin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Wyoming 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Totals 25 8 8 0 0 3 14 11 6 12 0 3 90
%Total 28% 9% 9% 0% 0% 3% 16% 12% 7% 13% 0% 3%
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California 1998 Criminal Law and Procedure 
 
F NF SCF SCNF CPF CPNF FCOCA D C COP Counsel NFCOCA Total Ca law
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Alaska 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Arizona 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Arkansas 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1%
California 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Colorado 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 4 2%
Connectic 2 3 2 0 0 0 1 5 0 1 0 0 14 8%
Delaware 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
DC 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 4 2%
Florida 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 2%
Georgia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Hawaii 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 0 0 9 5%
Iowa 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 3%
Idaho 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Illinois 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 1%
Indiana 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 2%
Kansas 4 0 3 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 10 6%
Kentucky 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 5 3%
Louisiana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Massachus 4 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 4%
Maryland 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 5 3%
Maine 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 1%
Michigan 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1%
Minnestoa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 1%
Mississipp 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 6 3%
Missouri 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Montana 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Nebraska 2 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 8 5%
Nevada 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 3 0 5 0 0 12 7%
NewHamp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1%
New Jerse 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 2%
New Mexi 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
New York 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1%
North Caro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
North Dak 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 6 3%
Ohio 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 5 3%
Oklahoma 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1%
Oregon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Pennsylva 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Rhode Isla 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
South Caro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1%
South Dak 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1%
Tennessee 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 3%
Texas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 1%
Utah 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 2%
Vermont 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 4 2%
Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Washingto 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 0 2 0 0 9 5%
West Virgi 4 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 7 4%
Wisconsin 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 4 2%
Wyoming 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 2%
Totals 40 15 18 1 1 5 31 36 1 25 2 0 175
23% 9% 10% 1% 1% 3% 18% 21% 1% 14% 1% 0%
F NF SCF SCNF CPF CPNF FCOCA D C COP Counsel NFCOCA
CLP 7 2 11 0 0 0 10 0 1 5 0 1 37
%TOTAL 4% 1% 6% 0% 0% 0% 6% 0% 1% 3% 0% 1% 21%
CLP 7 2 11 0 0 0 10 1 0 5 0 1 37
%CLP 19% 5% 30% 0% 0% 0% 27% 3% 0% 14% 0% 3% 100%
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Michigan 1998 Criminal Law and Procedure 
 
F NF SCF SCNF CPF CPNF FCOCA D C COP Counsel NFCOCA Total MI Law
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Alaska 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2%
Arizona 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Arkansas 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2%
California 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2%
Colorado 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2%
Connectic 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2%
Delaware 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
DC 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4%
Florida 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Hawaii 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 4%
Iowa 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 4%
Idaho 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Illinois 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Indiana 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2%
Kansas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2%
Kentucky 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 4%
Louisiana 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0%
Massachus 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 4%
Maryland 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 8%
Maine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Minnestoa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Michigan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Mississipp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Missouri 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Montana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Nebraska 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 6 12%
NewHamp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Nevada 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2%
New Jerse 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 6%
New Mexi 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2%
New York 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
North Caro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
North Dak 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Ohio 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Oklahoma 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2%
Oregon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Pennsylva 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Rhode Isla 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2%
South Caro 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2%
South Dak 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Tennessee 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4%
Texas 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 6 12%
Utah 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Vermont 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2%
Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Washingto 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
West Virgi 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 6%
Wisconsin 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2%
Wyoming 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2%
Totals 20 3 6 2 0 0 7 4 1 7 0 1 51
39% 6% 12% 4% 0% 0% 14% 8% 2% 14% 0% 2%
F NF SCF SCNF CPF CPNF FCOCA D C COP Counsel NFCOCA
CLP/CON 11 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 17
%TOTAL 22% 2% 0% 2% 2% 0% 4% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 33%
CLP/CON 11 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 17
%CLP 65% 6% 0% 6% 6% 0% 12% 0% 0% 6% 0% 0% 100%
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New Jersey 1998 Criminal Law and Procedure 
 
F NF SCF SCNF CPF CPNF FCOCA D C COP Counsel NFCOCA Total NJ Law Applies
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1%
Alaska 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Arizona 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1%
Arkansas 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2%
California 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 4%
Colorado 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Connectic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2%
Delaware 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
DC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1%
Florida 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Hawaii 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 3%
Iowa 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 6 7%
Idaho 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Illinois 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 3%
Indiana 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Kansas 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3%
Kentucky 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 3%
Louisiana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Massachus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 2%
Maryland 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 3%
Maine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 2%
Michigan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Minnestoa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Mississipp 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Missouri 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 2%
Montana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Nebraska 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 3%
Nevada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
NewHamp 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2%
New Jerse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
New Mexi 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 2%
New York 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1%
North Caro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
North Dak 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 7%
Ohio 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 7 8%
Oklahoma 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Oregon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Pennsylva 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 3%
Rhode Isla 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
South Caro 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 3%
South Dak 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 3%
Tennessee 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 2%
Texas 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Utah 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Vermont 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 3%
Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Washingto 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2%
West Virgi 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 5 6%
Wisconsin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Wyoming 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1%
Totals 25 8 8 0 0 3 14 11 6 12 0 3 90
28% 9% 9% 0% 0% 3% 16% 12% 7% 13% 0% 3%
F NF SCF SCNF CPF CPNF FCOCA D C COP Counsel NFCOCA
CLP/CON 2 2 3 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 11
% Total 2% 2% 3% 0% 0% 0% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 12%
CLP/CON 2 2 3 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 11
%CLP 18% 18% 27% 0% 0% 0% 36% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
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This thesis examines Horizontal Federalism and Policy Dissemination in a federal system 
by analyzing the state supreme courts of California, Michigan and New Jersey during various 
terms in their history, using a unique form of citation analysis that builds upon prior efforts.  I 
want to see what, if anything, a raw citation count says about prestige or reputation.  For 
example, what types of cases are cited?  Are they followed, not followed, or part of a dissent or 
concurrence?  Are cases expanding the rights of the criminally accused cited frequently by sister 
courts? The normative literature associates prestige with expanding the rights of criminal 
suspects using state constitutions. (The New Judicial Federalism) Similarly, reputation and 
prestige are also associated with high citation counts by sister courts.  My first objective is to 
determine what is actually being cited and why and my second purpose is to ascertain whether 
decisions expanding the rights of criminal suspects are more frequently cited than other types of 
cases.  If prestige and the New Judicial Federalism are closely associated, and high citation 
counts denote prestige, then it follows that a large percentage of citations by sister courts would 
be to such decisions.  I conclude that, contrary to expectations, decisions involving the New 
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Judicial Federalism only constitute a small percentage of positive citations by sister courts and in 
many cases are negative.  The most likely explanation appears to be the method of judicial 
selection and the level of a given state Supreme Court's accountability to the public.    
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